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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation I study the impacts of fiscal policies in different monetary settings. In
the first chapter, I empirically analyze the impact of fiscal policies on pairwise co-movements
of business cycles in the European Monetary Union between the years of 1999 and 2016. In
the second chapter, I develop a theoretical model which let me examine the impact of future
fiscal consolidation around the zero lower bound interest rate. I explore welfare implications
of the timing of future fiscal consolidation.
In the first chapter, I empirically examine the impact of national fiscal policies on the
bilateral synchronization of business cycles among the euro zone countries and discuss how
this impact changes over time between 1999 and 2016. I find that divergences in fiscal
balances significantly decrease the synchronization among EZ countries on average. However,
this relation is not linear in time. In fact, in the last period when the fiscal austerity measures
are adopted, bilateral BCS increases with an increase in differences in fiscal balance. I
also discover that the impact of an expansionary fiscal policy (decreasing the surplus or
increasing the deficit) on the BCS is greater if the country is running a surplus rather than
a deficit. On the other hand, I observe that between 2013 and 2016 if a country with budget
deficit performs an expansionary fiscal policy, this increases the BCS which implies that the
expansionary fiscal policies in that period are likely countercyclical in nature to neutralize
the impacts of asymmetric shocks in the EZ area.
In the second chapter, I analyze the effects of different timing of fiscal consolidations under
different fiscal policy rules in a New Keynesian framework with endogenously binding zero
lower bound. I find that the anticipated future government spending cuts have amplifying
effects on the current fiscal stimulus only if the cuts are enacted in a timely manner and
government spending does not respond endogenously to the economy. Spending reversals in
the very short-run are very costly, while consolidation in the medium-run reduces welfare
costs. However, the precise optimal timing of consolidation varies with different fiscal policy
rules. If the labor income tax rate is used to stabilize the economy in addition to spending
adjustment, the economy is stimulated more compared to a lump-sum taxation rule and no
fiscal rule cases. When the government spending responds to output and debt endogenously,
the fiscal consolidation occurs endogenously. In this case, additional spending cuts depress
the economy and the welfare gain of the cuts at the optimal timing is negligible.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of tables iv
List of figures vi
Acknowledgements viii
1 Effects of Fiscal Policies on Business Cycle Synchronization in the Euro
Zone 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Empirical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.1 Data and Specification of Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.2 Basic Model Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2.3 Control Variables and Their Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2.4 Results with Control Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.2.5 IV and GMM-IV Estimations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3 Does the impact of fiscal balance differences on BCS change through time? 17
1.3.1 Quasicorrelation Measure for BCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.3.2 Estimation Results with Quasicorrelation BCS Measure . . . . . . . 19
1.4 How does an increase in fiscal balance of country i affect BCS between country
i and j ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.5 Various Analysis on Different Measures for Bilateral BCS and Differences in
Fiscal Stance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
i
1.5.1 Different Measures for Bilateral BCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.5.2 Different measures for Differences in Fiscal Stance . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.6 Discussion of the Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.8 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.8.1 Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.8.2 Cyclical Adjustment Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.8.3 Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.8.4 Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
References 59
2 The Optimal Timing of Fiscal Consolidation Around the Zero Lower
Bound 64
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.2.1 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.3 Impulse Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.3.1 Why does the ZLB matter? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.3.2 Why does the timing of the government cuts matter? . . . . . . . . 76
2.4 Welfare Analysis of the Timing of Fiscal Consolidation . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.5 Models with Different Fiscal Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
2.5.1 Lump-sum Taxation Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
2.5.2 Distortionary Income Tax Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.5.3 Government Spending Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2.7 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
2.7.1 Derivations of the Equations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
2.7.2 Steady State Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
ii
2.7.3 Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
References 112
iii
List of Tables
1.1 Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1.2 Descriptive statistics of various fiscal measure variables . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
1.3 Descriptive statistics of new fiscal measure variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
1.4 Basic Model Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
1.5 POLS, FE, and RE estimations with control variables . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1.6 First stage OLS results of 3SLS estimation for endogenous variables; fiscal
balance and bilateral trade. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1.7 3SLS, one-step GMM, and two-step GMM estimations . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
1.8 POLS, FE and 3SLS estimations with interactive fiscal measure dummies . 47
1.9 POLS, FE and RE estimations with quasi-correlation GDP. . . . . . . . . . 48
1.10 POLS, FE and RE estimations with quasi-correlation GDP for primary
balance and net interest payments differences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
1.11 First stage OLS results of 3SLS estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
1.12 POLS, 3SLS and GMM-IV estimations with new fiscal stance measures. . . 51
1.13 POLS, 3SLS and GMM-IV estimations with time dummy interactions of new
fiscal stance measures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
1.14 First stage OLS results of 3SLS estimation with new fiscal measure. . . . . 53
1.15 POLS, 3SLS and GMM-IV estimations with new fiscal stance measures. . . 54
1.16 POLS, 3SLS, and GMM-IV estimations with time dummy interactions of new
fiscal stance measures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
1.17 POLS, FE and 3SLS estimations with different BCS measures . . . . . . . . 56
iv
1.18 POLS, FE and 3SLS estimations with different BCS measures . . . . . . . . 57
1.19 POLS, FE AND GMM-IV estimations with different fiscal measures . . . . 58
v
List of Figures
1.1 GDP movements and government budget balance for Germany and Ireland 36
1.2 GDP correlations and fiscal deficit differences for 1999Q1-2016Q4 . . . . . . 37
1.3 GDP correlations and fiscal balance differences for 1999Q1-2016Q4 . . . . . 38
1.4 Mean of time-varying effect of primary balance differences on bilateral BCS. 39
1.5 Time-varying effect of primary balance differences on bilateral BCS. . . . . 40
2.1 Annual debt per GDP in percentages for the US, the UK, France, Germany,
Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain between 2004-2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
2.2 The policy rates for the US, the UK, and the Eurozone for 2006Q1-2017Q1 91
2.3 Path of the growth rate of the discount factor as a negative demand shock
and path of the government spending as a fiscal policy instrument . . . . . 92
2.4 Impulse responses to the preference shock with and without the ZLB . . . . 93
2.5 Impulse responses to the preference shock with and without the ZLB . . . . 94
2.6 Impulse responses to fiscal stimulus with and without the ZLB . . . . . . . 95
2.7 Impulse responses to fiscal stimulus with and without the ZLB . . . . . . . 96
2.8 Impulse responses to fiscal stimulus and future government spending reversal. 97
2.9 Impulse responses to fiscal stimulus and future government spending reversal. 98
2.10 Impulse responses to future government spending reversal. . . . . . . . . . . 99
2.11 Impulse responses to future government spending reversal. . . . . . . . . . . 100
2.12 Impulse responses to future government reversal with different timing. . . . 101
2.13 Impulse responses to future government reversal with different timing. . . . 102
vi
2.14 The relation between the welfare cost and the timing of the future government
reversals when there is no fiscal rule in the economy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
2.15 Impulse responses with the lump-sum tax rule. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
2.16 Impulse responses with the lump-sum tax rule. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
2.17 The relation between the welfare cost and the timing of the future government
reversals when there is lump-sum taxation rule in the economy. . . . . . . . 105
2.18 Net effect of future fiscal consolidation with and without lump-sum tax rule. 106
2.19 Net effect of future fiscal consolidation with and without lump-sum tax rule. 106
2.20 Impulse responses with distortionary income tax rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
2.21 Impulse responses with distortionary income tax rule. . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
2.22 The effect of timing of future government spending cuts on the duration of
the ZLB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
2.23 The relation between the welfare cost and the timing of the future government
reversals in the presence of the labor income tax rate rule. . . . . . . . . . . 108
2.24 Impulse responses without fiscal consolidation, with lump sum tax rule and
with labor income tax rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
2.25 Impulse responses without fiscal consolidation, with lump sum tax rule and
with labor income tax rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
2.26 Impulse responses with a government spending rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
2.27 Impulse responses with both a government spending rule and an additional
fiscal consolidation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
2.28 The relation between the welfare cost and the timing of the future government
reversals in the presence of the government spending rule . . . . . . . . . . 111
vii
Acknowledgements
I would like to acknowledge some people who support me throughout this journey. First, I
must thank my thesis committee, Fabio Ghironi, Peter Ireland, and Georg Strasser for their
personal and professional guidance. I am very grateful for their patience and understanding.
My special thanks go to Keith Kuester for sharing his Matlab codes upon which I built the
programming for Chapter 2.
I cannot overlook the support and the help of the Director of Graduate studies, Richard
Tresch and the Economics Graduate Programs Assistant, Gail Sullivan. Also, I am grateful
for emotional support of my dear friends, Nazan Aksan, Stacey Chan, Ezgi Ozturk, and
Nurdan Yasar.
My deep thanks go to my family who believe in me more than anyone, including myself.
My parents who always support me and help me with whatever I pursue. They are my
inspiration in life to ask questions, to learn and to use the knowledge to make a difference
in people’s lives. My big brother, Emre, has been always a source of strength for me. My
dear husband, Richard, and his family never doubt me and support me in every step of this
journey. Last but not least, I would like to thank my wonderful son, Jonathan who will be
able to read this dissertation a few years from today. Thank you for providing me with the
strength and the motivation to go on with your beautiful smile.
viii
Chapter 1
Effects of Fiscal Policies on
Business Cycle Synchronization in
the Euro Zone
1.1 Introduction
Highly synchronized economies are fundamentally important for a monetary union to
function properly (Mundell, 196138; Alesina and Barro, 20021). An important determinant of
synchronization is national fiscal policy. Recent financial and sovereign crises in the euro area
present an opportunity to investigate this determinant, where both national fiscal stimulus
and then austerity programs have been implemented. Hence, in this paper, I analyze the
impact of bilateral differences in fiscal positions of the euro zone countries on the bilateral
synchronization of business cycles and how it changes across time periods.
To highlight possible correlation between fiscal position differences and the co-movements
of the economies, Figure 1.1 shows GDP movements (in the left y-axis) and budget balances
per GDP (in the right y-axis) for Ireland and Germany.1 After the start of the Great
Recession in 2008q2, the output levels in both countries drop very sharply, however Germany
experiences a deeper bust cycle compared to Ireland. Both recover slowly, but Ireland
experiences another deep bust cycle following sovereign turmoil in the euro area. We also
observe that starting from 2008, public budget balances deteriorate for both countries, due to
1The drastic rise of Ireland’s GDP in 2015q1 can mislead the interpretations, however, here I only focus
on the years between 2008 and 2014. Nonetheless, using GNI in my analysis doesn’t change the main results.
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possible drops in government revenues in the recession, the fiscal stimulus programs in both
countries2 and the Irish-banking crisis in case of Ireland. After 2010, Germany promptly
starts austerity measures bringing its budget to positive levels with cuts in government
expenditures and increases in revenues.3 Ireland adopts austerity measures rather slowly,
accumulating debt and increasing interest payments which worsen its budget balance.4 After
2010 amplified desynchronization of two economies is likely associated with increasing wedge
between their budget balances.
With the observation above in mind, I empirically examine possible causal association
between bilateral differences in fiscal positions and the business cycle synchronization (BCS),
i.e., GDP correlations in the euro zone (EZ) area. The data includes for 15 EZ countries,
dating from 1999q1 to 2016q4, separated into four sub periods: 1999q1-2003q4, 2004q1-
2008q2, 2008q3-2012q4, 2013q1-2016q4. In a panel data set-up, I employ pooled OLS, fixed
effects and instrumental variables methods. I analyze the dynamics of the impact of fiscal
position differences. To study the dynamics further, I run moving-window regressions of fixed
effects model, after switching to an ”instantaneous” synchronization measure. I propose a
bilateral measure for fiscal position which can reveal more information on how each national
fiscal policy changes bilateral BCS. As a robustness check, different synchronization measures
for BCS and components of fiscal balance are used in the last section.
I find that the impact of differences in fiscal balance on BCS is negative in the euro area
for the whole time sample. Nonetheless, I observe that this impact is not linear. In fact, in
the last period of the sample, bilateral BCS increases with an increase in differences in fiscal
balance. This result highlights that studies which treat the impact of fiscal stance differences
among EZ countries as time-invariant fail to notice the circumstances where expansionary
and yet stabilizing fiscal policy can contribute to positive co-movement of the business cycles
2In 2009 and 2010 the total stimulus package in Germany was 1.4% and 1.9%, where as in Ireland it was
0.5% and 0.5% (ECB, 201221)
3Cuts are mostly done in public administration and military spending (Ferreiro et al., 201524)
4Ireland’s austerity measures mostly include increase in VAT and income tax for both high income and
low income households (Ferreiro et al., 201524) which might curb the non-government expenditure, hence
aggregate demand and keep the economy in a deeper bust.
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in the euro area.
This study finds that the national fiscal policies that have been implemented since
the financial crisis and beyond are a positive determinant of BCS, although current high
expansionary fiscal policies can raise the question of the sustainability of high debt and
persistent deficit levels. This result is consistent with the notion (of counter-cyclical
fiscal policy) that asymmetric national fiscal policies can be implemented as a response to
asymmetric shocks or to the same shocks with asymmetric results, and helps to retain the
stability. These fiscal policies neutralize the effects on the cycles and maintain synchronization
of business cycles among monetary union countries.5
I discover that the expansionary fiscal policies (reducing the surplus or increasing the
deficit) reduces the BCS. Similarly, the contractionary fiscal policies (increasing the surplus
or decreasing the deficit) increases the BCS. However, the magnitude of the impact changes
if the country runs a deficit or a surplus. This can be explained by different expectations of
future offsetting fiscal policies. For instance, an expansionary fiscal policy results in lower
inflationary effect as consumers expect future fiscal contraction if the country currently
runs a deficit. As the results are expected to be less permanent, the decline in BCS will be
smaller.
In the initial part of my analysis, the absolute difference of government budget balance for
each country pair proxies the bilateral fiscal stance difference.6 Unfortunately this measure
treats the fiscal position divergences similarly regardless of whether they are due to changes
in surplus or deficit. Moreover, it takes into account only bilateral fiscal positions rather
than the fiscal positions for individual countries. Nonetheless, I apply it to my analysis for
comparability to the previous literature (Darvas et al., 200517; Furceri and Karras, 200826;
5On the other hand, fiscal policy can be a source to generate fluctuations in the economy, for instance, for
political or demographic reasons. In this case, pro-cyclical fiscal policy can reduce co-movements of business
cycles (Darvas et al., 200517).
6Fiscal stance is used to refer to the cyclically adjusted primary balance by the European Council. Here I
am using it interchangeable with cyclically adjusted budget balance.
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Hauge and Skulevold, 201228). In the second part of the paper I present variables that
measure the impact of individual fiscal policies and take into account the direction of the
balance.
Studying the impact of economic policies raises a problem of endogeneity, i.e., the policies
may be responses to the economic situations. There are a couple of ways to identify the impact
of fiscal policy in the literature. One is using narrative approach, where the fiscal measure
is fiscal policy rules, implemented independently of the economic situation, for instance,
increase in military expenditures, or reduction of the income taxes, or implementation of
new lump-sum subsidies. The other method is to use instrumental variables that are related
to the fiscal measure but not related to the errors - the part of the dependent variable that
cannot be explained by the fiscal measure. In this study I use the latter. I use gravity model
instrumental variables, such as bilateral distance between countries, common language,
common border and growth differences for bilateral trade. Following Crespo-Cuaresma et al.
(2011)15, I identify the fiscal measure by the number of years left of the government until the
next election, the ratio of government votes share to opposition votes share, and the ratio
of working age population to population over 65. Additionally, following political economy
literature7, I use the government’s political position as an IV. I employ three stage least
squares (3SLS) and GMM-IV method by Arellano-Bond where lags of level or differenced
regressors are utilized as instruments.
Business cycle synchronization in monetary unions and its determinants are widely
studied in the literature (Fata´s, 199723; Frankel and Rose, 199725; Imbs, 200430; Baxter and
Kouparistas, 20056; Haan et al., 200827; Inklaar et al., 200831). My paper complements those
with a focus on the fiscal policy and its effects on the BCS in the European monetary union.8
It contributes to the existing literature by (i) analyzing the time-varying aspect of the effect,
(ii) covering the recent time period aftermath of the financial and sovereign debt turmoils,
7Hibbs, 197729; Besley and Coate, 19977
8There are studies which analyze the fiscal policy impact across OECD countries (Camacho et al., 200610;
Darvas et al., 2005; Inklaar et al.,2008; Crucini et al., 201116) or in monetary unions such as the US or some
regions of France and Germany (Clark and Wincoop, 200112; Kalemli-Ozcan et al. 200133).
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(iii) constructing a different fiscal measure which takes into account asymmetric impacts of
fiscal policies when countries run a surplus or a deficit, (iv)solving the endogeneity problem
with IV estimations.
In the literature there are four main studies that have the same question at the core as
in this paper: Bo¨wer et al. (2006)8, Hauge et al. (2012), Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2011),
and Degiannakis et al. (2016)19. The first two studies focus on the fiscal convergence as in
Darvas et al. (2005) and conclude that country-pair fiscal convergence (divergence) increases
(decreases) country-pair BCS. By allowing this impact to change over time I conclude
differently that the impact of fiscal policy is time varying and higher differences in fiscal
positions are associated with higher BCS in the last period. Bo¨wer et al. (2006) apply
extreme-bond analysis to examine the robustness of factors of the correlation of business
cycles for the period before and after the introduction of the euro until 2004. Hauge et al.
(2012) only employ pooled OLS and fixed effects model for 1980-2010.
Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2011) focus on the impact of both fiscal policy and trade
integration on the union-wide business cycles. They use structural unobserved components
model to measure BCS and they employ pooled OLS, GMM and IV methods. They find
that as budget surplus increases for each country, the synchronization of this country with
respect to the European Union increases. They measure fiscal policy by only budget balance
and only for the period 1995-2008.
Defiannakis et al. (2016), on the other hand, estimate dynamic impacts of national fiscal
policies on the co-movement of each country with union-wide business cycles (following Artis,
20034). Whereas I follow Darvas et al. (2005) and Camacho et al. (2006) and use bilateral
measure for BCS, Defiannakis et al. (2016) use a Diag-BEKK model which requires large
volatilities in the data with an annual panel from 1980 until 2012 for 10 euro area countries.
Although the focus of my study is also on time-varying impact of differences in fiscal policy,
the measurement method in Defiannakis et al. (2016) varies significantly from other studies
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and is less straightforward. In fact, their measure for the impact of fiscal policy is calculated
rather indirectly without any economic interpretation of business cycles.9 Nonetheless, my
findings that fiscal policy significantly affects the business cycle synchronization in the euro
area, and that this effect is significantly changing over time, overlaps with their results.
In Section 1.2, I explain the data and the specification of the variables. I introduce the
basic empirical model, steps to improve the results, and the estimation methods to be
used. In Section 1.3, I analyze the dynamics of the impact of fiscal balance differences. In
Section 1.4, I propose a new measure for fiscal balance that can gauge the individual effect
of national fiscal policies on the BCS. Last in Section 1.5, I apply different measures for
bilateral BCS and fiscal stance differences to examine the robustness of the findings in the
previous sections. In Section 1.6, I discuss possible economic explanations for the empirical
results. In Section 1.7, I conclude and discuss applications of the findings.
1.2 Empirical Model
1.2.1 Data and Specification of Variables
I use quarterly data from 1999q1 until 2016q4 for 15 EZ countries; Austria, Belgium,
Estonia, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain.10 Data sources are mainly OECD National Accounts,
Eurostat Quarterly National Accounts, Eurostat Quarterly Government Statistics, and
IMF Direction of Trade.11 I divide the whole sample into four periods: 1999q1-2003q4,
2004q1-2008q2, 2008q3-2012q4, 2013q1-2016q4, leaving me a panel set with 420 number
of observations.12 Although selection of cut-offs for the sub periods is manual, each can
9The authors first estimate dynamic correlation coefficient between business cycles of monetary union and
each country. Next, they calculate the errors from a linear regression of business cycles on lag of government
net lending with constant coefficients. They propose that the dynamic correlation coefficient between the
errors and union-wide business cycles gives the synchronization from which impact of fiscal policy is removed.
Then by subtracting two dynamic correlation coefficients, they end up a measure for time-varying effect of
fiscal policy on the business cycle synchronization between EMU12 and each country.
10The rest of euro zone countries; Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta are not included in the sample since
there is limited data available for these countries.
11For the details of data sources see the appendix.
12There are 105 (15x14/2) unique country pairs with four periods.
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be justified by an economic reasoning. The first period, 1999q1-2003q4 corresponds to the
initial years of adopting the euro; the second period, 2004q1-2008q2 include the years of
advancing the integration in the EZ area; the third period, 2008q3-2012q4 covers the Great
Recession and the sovereign crisis in Europe; and the last period, 2013q1-2016q4, includes
the years of adopting fiscal austerity measures. Quarterly data series limit time dimension
of the panel data, only going back to 1999q; although, it allows me to analyze the business
cycles in the last decade with a larger number of observations.
BusinessCycleSynchronizationijt = β0 + β1FiscalBalanceDifferenceijt + uijt (1.1)
Equation 1.1 is a baseline empirical model to be estimated. β1 is the coefficient of interest.
Following the literature (Frankel and Rose, (1997) (1998)) I use GDP correlations between
two countries over a given period of time as a measurement of business cycle synchronization
(BCS) for the country pairs, (i,j). To construct BCS variable, I take the logarithm of real
GDP. I de-trend the series with Hodrick-Prescott filter to capture the cyclical fluctuations.13
As a next step, to specify fiscal balance difference variable for the country pairs, I gather
seasonally and calendar adjusted data series of general government net balance as percentage
of GDP for each country.14 Cyclical adjustment of the series is calculated by the method
that OECD applies.15 Following Darvas et al. (2005), I take absolute difference of fiscal
balance series for each country pair. For instance, Germany and Ireland have overall fiscal
balances of -2.7% and 1% in 1999q1, respectively. Therefore the difference in their fiscal
position in 1999q1 is 3.7%. For each sub period, fiscal balance difference is defined as the
average of balance difference over period t for each country pair (i,j). Simply Equation 1.1
13In the literature HP is highly used method for BCS. However, there are some papers showing the results
of different filtering methods; such as first differencing, Baxter-King (BK) filter, Christiano-Fitzgerald (CF)
filter, and Butterworth (BW) filter (Artis, 2003; Frankel and Rose,1997)
14I adjust the unadjusted series by a simple moving average method. I double check the method by
comparing the series that are also reported in seasonally adjusted form by Eurostat and the series that I
manually adjust. I find that the difference between the series was negligible.
15For the details see the appendix.
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can be rewritten in the following form:
BCSijTn = β0 + β1FDijTn + uijTn (1.2)
where BCSijTn = Corr(GDPi, GDPj)Tn and FDijTn =
1
Tn
Σtk |FDitk−FDjtk |, n = 1, 2, 3, 4
and Tn ∈ {T1, T2, T3, T4}.
Table 1.1 displays the descriptive statistics for bilateral BCS measure and bilateral fiscal
balance difference in the first two rows. Time variation and cross-individual variation are
not significantly different from each other. However, variation of fiscal measure differences
and BCS among country pairs is more than variation over time. Figure 1.2 is plotting
bilateral FD on the x-axis and bilateral BCS on the y-axis for whole time sample. Each dot
refers to a country pair. Red dots are bilateral measures of France with respect to other EZ
countries. Similarly blue dots are for Germany. There is an obvious correlation between
bilateral BCS and FD shown in the plot, however it is not enough to conclude any causal
one before discussing the results in the next section.
1.2.2 Basic Model Results
The results of pooled OLS estimation for Equation 1.2 with time period dummies are
shown in Table 1.4. There are 15x14/2 country pairs with 4 time periods; hence, the
number of observation is 420. The standard errors in the parentheses are clustered by panel
individuals, i.e., country pairs.
The coefficient of fiscal balance differences on the business cycle synchronization is
statistically significant and negative, suggesting that as two countries implement fiscal
policies that cause differences in their fiscal balances, the synchronization between their
business cycles decreases. This is the same conclusion found in Darvas et al. (2005), Hauge
et al. (2012) and Bo¨wer et al. (2006).
In this estimation, the constant term refers to the base period which is 1999q1-2003q4
in this case. It is significantly different than zero and positive. The remaining coefficients
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D2, D3, and D4, identify the differences between the base period and the associated period.
Significant positive coefficients of D2 and D3 suggest that on average the BCS is higher in
the second and third period compared to the initial years of the euro. In the last period, the
economies correlate less however the difference is not statistically significant.
Fixed and random effects models handle the bias due to excluding the time-invariant
variables which can be country specific or country pair specific variables. For example,
common border between a country pair can affect the correlation of these two economies.
Or the year of adopting the euro can affect the correlation of this country with the rest of
the country sample. Even after accounting for fixed and random effects, column (2) and (3)
in Table 1.4 suggest that fiscal balance differences have significant negative effect on the
pairwise BCS.
Certainly this is a basic model with problems of omission bias, endogeneity bias. Each is
managed and discussed in the following sections.
1.2.3 Control Variables and Their Specifications
In this section I estimate Equation 1.2 with control variables which reduce the omission
bias. There is an extensive empirical work on the determinants of the business cycle
synchronization (Haan et al., 2007). I utilize a few that are common to these studies such
as bilateral trade, similarity in industrial structure, and openness of trade to the rest of the
world. Additionally, I include the variables for current account differences, real exchange
rates, and government bond yield differences.16
Bilateral Trade: In theory (Inklaar et al., 200831) the impact of bilateral trade on business
cycle co-movements is ambiguous. In the case of an increase in income in one country, demand
for both domestic and foreign goods increases, and if the business cycles are dominated by
demand fluctuations, then the trade between these countries lead to increasing BCS (Inklaar
et al. 2008). On the other hand, international trade can cause industry specialization
16Factor endowments, similarity in baskets of traded goods are other factors in Baxter et al., 2005).
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(Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2001) in partner countries leading to decreasing BCS if the economies
are dominated by industry specific shocks.
Majority of empirical studies (Frankel and Rose, 1997, 1998; Baxter and Kouparitsas, 2005;
Imbs, 2004; Inklaar et al. 2008) show that as countries increase trade between each other,
the business cycle synchronization among them increases, too.17 Hence, I expect the sign to
be positive.
Following the previous literature, I assume bilateral trade measure between country i and j
for period, Tn is;
BilateralTradeijTn =
1
Tn
∑
t
log
(
Xijt +Xjit
Xit +Mit +Xjt +Mjt
)
(1.3)
where Xijt (Xjit) refers to export volume from country i (j) to country j (i) at time t, Xit
and Mit (Xjt and Mjt) refer to total export and import with respect to the rest of the world
for country i (j) at time t. Data series are collected from IMF Direction of Trade dataset.
Export and import values are gross values in US dollars and exclude the services.
Similarity in Production Structure: Convergence in the production structure increases
BCS since industry specific shocks likely have similar impacts among countries if industry
specific shocks cause the variations of business cycles. Following Calderon et al. (2007)9,
(Imbs (1998, 1999, 2003); Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005); Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2001)), I
compute an index for similarity in industrial structure by collecting the data for the shares
of eleven sectors in the total production of each country18, Shit, where h refers to the sector,
i refers to the country, and t refers to the time. Next, I calculate similarity in industrial
production index for a country pair (i , j) at time t as;
SIPijt = 1−
n∑
h
|Shit − Shjt| (1.4)
17Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013)32 find that adding financial integration in the models reduces the impact of
bilateral trade. Duval et al. (2016)20 on the other hand shows that using value added bilateral trade data
rather than gross bilateral trade data captures the trade impact and that it is significantly positive even with
inclusion of financial integration.
18Data source is Eurostat Production Sectoral Breakdown Data Series.
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Note that if the sectoral production shares converge each other - two countries have a
similar sectoral structure, the sum approaches to 0, hence SIPijt approaches to one. For
the panel dataset, I take the average of SIPijt for each period; SIPijTn = 1/Tn
∑
t SIPijt.
If the business cycles are influenced mostly by the sectoral supply shocks, then as SIPijTn
increases, bilateral BCS is expected to increase as well.
Openness to Trade: The paper focuses only on the countries that are in the euro zone.
However, in the sample there are countries, such as Germany, France, Italy which have
higher volumes of trade from/to the non-euro zone countries. Having a measure for the
openness to trade with the rest of the world (the non-euro zone countries) incorporates
external factors that cause business cycle fluctuations.19 Therefore, I calculate the following
measure;
nonEZTradeijTn =
1
Tn
∑
t
log
(
T−EZit + T
−EZ
jt
T−jiEZt + T
−i
jEZt
)
(1.5)
where T−EZit refers to total trade (export and import) volume of country i with the non-euro
zone countries, (-EZ) at time t, and T−jiEZt refers to total trade level of country i with respect
to the euro zone countries, excluding the country j at time t. If country i increases its trade
volume with respect to the non-euro zone countries and imports the shocks from its non EZ
trade partners, one can expect that this leads to lower BCS with EZ trade partners, ceteris
paribus. On the other hand, if two EZ countries have common non-EZ trading partners,
external shocks from this common partner affect both EZ countries. In this case increasing
trade with common non EZ trading partners tends to increase the BCS among EZ countries.
Current Account Differences: Another control variable of interest in this paper is
current account balance difference which is measured as CAijTn = 1/Tn
∑
t
∣∣∣CAit − CAjt∣∣∣.
In this calculation CAit refers to the current account balance per GDP for country i at time
t. Thus positive values of CAit refers to current account surpluses.
Current account balance can be interpreted as inter-temporal trade between present and
19For instance, Germany, the 3rd largest export economy in the world with an export destination, the U.S.
in the first place, experienced great fall in demand for its exported goods in the Great Recession.
11
future, or a proxy for the level of consumption smoothing, hence smoothing output fluctua-
tions. Therefore as two countries differ in level of current balances -higher CAijt - they also
differ in level of consumption smoothing mechanism. Their economies tend to synchronize
less, ceteris paribus.
Price Level Index: The price level differences between country i and j is another relevant
control variable. CPIit is consumer price index for overall goods for country i at time t.
20 21
Average of consumer price index ratios, CPIijTn = 1/Tn
∑
t log
(
CPIit
CPIjt
)
gives a measure
for average real exchange rate of country i with respect to j for the period, Tn. If the real
exchange rate of i increases, the goods in country i become relatively more expensive and the
goods in country j become relatively cheaper. There occurs expenditure switching towards
country j’s goods, increasing the demand for country j’s goods, hence the output of country j.
On the other hand, the demand for more expensive goods of country i falls and it decreases
country i’s output. This results in lower BCS between i and j.
Government Bond Yields: The last control variable of interest in the paper is the
differences of government bond yields for country pairs. I collect European Monetary Union
harmonized rates for each euro zone country in the sample. Long-term government bonds in
the secondary market are considered to compute the data series. As it is available in monthly
frequency, I use the end of quarter values. I calculated the government bond “spreads”
between country i and j for the period, Tn as;
EMUrateijTn = 1/Tn
∑
t
∣∣∣EMUrateit − EMUratejt∣∣∣. Expected sign is negative for this
variable.
Including the control variables in Equation 1.2 leads to;
BCSijTn = β0 + β1FDijTn + β2BiTradeijTn + β3SIPijTn + β4nonEZTradeijTn
+β5CAijTn + β6CPIijTn + β7EMUrateijTn + uijTn
(1.6)
20Eurostat Harmonized Consumer Price Index is used.
21Another price index that can be used in this context is unit labor cost index. It gives similar results with
CPI.
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1.2.4 Results with Control Variables
In this section I study the estimation results for Equation 1.6 that are given in Table 1.5.
The estimation methods that I employ are pooled OLS, fixed effect, and random effect.
Column (1) in Table 1.5 gives pooled OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in
parentheses. In this estimation the number of observations decreases to 364 due to lack of
EMU rate data for Estonia. Adding the control variables significantly reduces the upward
bias due to omission of relevant variables. The impact of fiscal balance difference is still
significantly negative as it is in the basic OLS model. On average if there is a one percent
increase in the difference of fiscal balances per GDP between two countries, correlation of
their GDP drops by 0.0213.
To see if the model is acceptable, it is beneficial to check whether the coefficients of the
control variables align with expectations. Bilateral trade between countries has a positive
impact on the BCS as expected.However it is not statistically significant. Additionally, the
variables such as similarity of industrial production, ratio of trade volume with the non-euro
and the euro zone partners have insignificant negative effects on BCS in the euro zone. The
first one is not inconsistent with the studies which find insignificant weak causality from
similarity of production structure to BCS.22 The latter can be explained by opposing impacts
of having a group of mutual or uncommon non-EZ trading partners. Moreover current
account balance difference, CPI ratios, EMU rate differences have significant negative signs
as expected.
Adding control variables can help to improve the results, however there are still other
variables that are not in this estimation but can affect BCS. Some of them are time invariant.
One of the main advantages of fixed effects model is to treat the problem of missing time-
invariant variables. Also if the assumed model is FE, pooled OLS estimators of the coefficients
will be inconsistent. The results in column (2) in Table 1.5 show that the coefficient of fiscal
22Bo¨wer et al. (2006) find that it is not robust in EBA.
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balance difference preserves its significance and sign; although, it drops to 0.0137.23
Random effects (RE) model assumes that the time-invariant random variables are not
correlated with the regressors in the estimation. If the preceding assumption under which
RE coefficients are consistent holds then RE coefficients are also efficient compared to OLS
and FE models (Cameron and Trivedi (2005)11). Table 1.5 displays the estimation results
for RE coefficients in column (3). Pooled OLS estimation is a special case of GLS estimation
of RE model where the weighted matrix is the identity matrix. Since there is a singular
solution in RE estimation, the variation in random effects is assumed to be zero. Therefore,
the results from RE estimation are the same as from pooled OLS.24
1.2.5 IV and GMM-IV Estimations
So far I have not addressed that fiscal measure is endogenous. Cyclical adjustment of
budget balance reduces simultaneity. However, it doesn’t account for the fact that fiscal
authorities may respond to the fluctuations in the output, for instance, by changing the
tax code or by increasing the public expenditure. In this case the causality runs from the
dependent variable to the regressor. To remove the endogeneity bias, I employ IV and
GMM-IV method.
3SLS IV estimation: Identification and Results
I initially use four main political and demographic instruments (Crespo-Cuaresma et
al., 2011; Hibbs 1977) for the fiscal measure variable. These are (i) bilateral differences
in government’s political position, (ii) bilateral differences in government’s terms left until
the next election, (iii) bilateral differences in government’s vote share per opposition’s vote
share and (iv) bilateral differences in population over age 65 per working population.25
23The estimate of ρ, fraction of variance due to fixed effects is 0.903 which suggests that almost all the
variation in bilateral BCS is associated with country-pair differences in BCS. F(10,90) statistics of the fixed
effects is 34.38 with p-value>0.0000. This suggests that there is significant country-pair effects, implying
that pooled OLS would be unfit.
24Hausman test for FE and RE estimators suggests that FE estimator is consistent and RE estimator is
inconsistent and not efficient.
25The data source for political and election system is QoG, 201743. The data source for demographic
variables is EU population structure and ageing data22.
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For bilateral trade, I utilize growth difference and three gravity model variables; (i)natural
logarithm of distance between capitals, (ii) common language, (iii) contagious proxy which
takes into account common language, common border, common colonial history (Mayer et
al. (2011)34).
Following Hibbs (1977)29 and Roesel (2016)40, I include government political position with
respect to the opposition. The political positions are categorized by three main positions:
right-wing (takes the value of 1), center (takes the value of 2), and left-wing (takes the value
of 3). Hence, bigger values of government political position indicate that the government has
a left-wing ruling party or coalition relative to the opposition parties on average over each
period. In the light of the results of Roesel (2016); left-wing local governments run higher
deficits than right-wing supervisors, one would expect that the fiscal balance decreases as
government political position gets closer to the left-wing ideology. In my paper I rather
use bilateral differences of government political positions relative to the opposition parties
positions for country pairs. Therefore, I would expect that the more the ruling parties differ
ideologically, the more the fiscal balance differences are.
Likewise, motivated by the results of Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2011)15, I exploit two
instruments: differences in the number of years left for the current ruling government until
the next election, i.e., GovtsLeftTerm and differences in the ruling party/parties votes
share with respect to the opposition party/parties votes share, i.e., PowerDistribution. The
theory26 behind the first instrument is the political cycles theory which suggests that as
the government gets closer to the end of its term, it utilizes the policy means to increase
the chances of getting reelected. Therefore smaller number of years left in the term are
associated with higher fiscal deficits. Similarly, the power of the ruling government relative
to the opposition is also associated with differences in fiscal deficits in the literature.27. This
suggests that if ruling government has a dominant position, i.e., higher votes share with
26As it is referred to Nordhaus (1975)39; Hibbs (1977); Sapir and Sekkat (2002)42; Mourao and Veiga
(2010)35 in Crespo-Cuaresma et al., (2011)
27Roubini and Sachs (1989)41; Corsetti and Roubini (1991)13; de Haan et al. (1999)18 are some of the
papers.
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respect to the opposition, it is likely to reduce the fiscal deficits. Hence as an application of
this literature to my model, countries with varying distribution of political power between
the ruling government and the opposition likely to differ in their fiscal balances, as well.
Last but not least, demographic instrument, i.e., the ratio of working population relative
to population over 65 has fiscal implications. Aging population above working population
directly strain fiscal budget through increasing public spending on old-age pensions and
health and long-term care and indirectly through falling government revenues due to likely
lower economic growth that comes with a shift in population towards less active groups.28
Accordingly, I take into account bilateral differences of the ratios of population over 65 to
working age population for each country pair. I expect that as this demographic structure
differs among countries, the fiscal stance divergences increase.
The first column of Table 1.6 displays the performance of the instruments for fiscal measure
variable. Although the sign of each instrument is positive as expected, only two variables;
government political position and governing term left until the next election, are statistically
significant. Nevertheless, R2 = 0.542 suggests that the model is performing fairly well for a
dynamic panel estimation.
The instruments for bilateral trade are rather very common in the literature. The first
stage OLS estimation results in the second column of Table 1.6 indicate that all instruments
are significantly relevant to the bilateral trade except differences in growth.
The first column of Table 1.7 demonstrates the results for three stage least square estimation
with the instrumental variables mentioned above. After tackling the endogeneity bias in the
fiscal measure and the bilateral trade, highly significant and negative coefficient of fiscal
balance difference affirms the findings in the previous section, i.e., fiscal balance differences
affect bilateral business cycles co-movements significantly and negatively among the euro
28Policy papers at this webpage2 and at this webpage22 are two policy papers on the demographics and its
fiscal implications in European Area and OECD countries.
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zone countries. Moreover, bilateral trade and other control variables preserve the expected
sign with statistically significant coefficients except the coefficient of nonEZvsEZTrade
variable.
GMM-IV estimation
Regardless of the theory and the intuition, supporting the use of political and demographic
instruments, it is necessary to show that the results are not weak with different choices of
instruments. Therefore, I utilize lags and differences of dependent and independent variables
as instruments in GMM-IV method. I estimate the coefficients with GMM-IV by Arellano
and Bond (1991)3. The results for one-step and two-step GMM-IV estimations are presented
in the second and the third column of Table 1.7, respectively.
The results from both estimations are consistent with previous findings. However, there
is a slight decrease in the magnitude of the effect of fiscal measure difference. Hansen test
statistics (not reported in the table) implies that the null hypothesis: the coefficients are
robust but weakened by many instruments cannot be rejected with p-value of 0.883. C-test
statistics (not reported in the table) verifies the joint validity of instruments with p-value of
0.920.
1.3 Does the impact of fiscal balance differences on BCS
change through time?
In this section, I study the dynamics of the impact of fiscal balance differences on BCS. As
theory suggests that fiscal policy can affect BCS in either way (Haan et al., 2007), a method
that assumes the effect is the same through out the sample may lead to underestimation
of the impact on average. In Figure 1.3 each dot displays bilateral BCS on the y-axis and
bilateral FD on the x-axis for four sub periods. This plot suggests time-varying nature of
the fiscal policy impact. Indeed, the direction of the impact can also change, as in the last
period it seems to be positive.
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I employ the same methods that I used in the previous sections; pooled OLS, FE, 3SLS
IV estimations with interactive time dummies for the fiscal balance differences. Therefore
the equation to be estimated takes the following form;
BCSijt = (β0 + β1D1 + β2D2 + β3D3) ∗ FDijt + Z ′ijtα+ uijt (1.7)
where Zijt is a vector of control variables and constant term. Base period for the coefficient
of fiscal balance difference is the last period, 2013q1-2016q4. β1, β2, and β3 give information
about the additional impact of FD on BCS for the time periods, 1999q1-2003q4, 2004q1-
2008q2 and 2008q3-2012q4 relative to the base period, respectively.
Table 1.8 shows the estimation results for Equation 1.7. Statistically significant values
for interactive dummy terms show that the impact of FD on BCS differs for these periods.
Moreover, the impact is found out to be positive for the last period where the EZ countries
taking austerity measures aftermath of sovereign turmoil in the monetary union.
These results lead me to the next section where I use a different measure for BCS where I
can investigate more on the dynamics of the impact of the fiscal balance difference on the
BCS.
1.3.1 Quasicorrelation Measure for BCS
So far the analysis depends on the selection of the time periods (time windows). However it
is also possible to study the impacts of fiscal stance on BCS with quasicorrelation of GDP for
country pairs.29 It is sometimes referred as ”instantaneous” business cycle synchronization
(Li (2017)). Following is the quasi correlation measure for each country pair:
Qcorrijt =
(Yit−Ymi )(Yjt−Ymj )
σiσj
where Y mi , Y
m
j are averages of GDP for the whole period for country i and j, respectively.
σi, σj are the standard errors of GDP for the whole period for country i and j, respectively.
29This measure has been used in the literature by Duval et al. (2016); Abiad (); Kalemli Ozcan et al. (2013
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Similarly I calculate instantaneous measures for fiscal balance difference and for the control
variables;
FDijt =
∣∣∣FDit − FDjt∣∣∣
BiTradeijt = log
(
Xijt+Xjit
Xit+Mit+Xjt+Mjt
)
SIPijt = 1−
∑n
h
∣∣∣Shit − Shjt∣∣∣
CAijt =
∣∣∣CAit − CAjt∣∣∣
CPIijt = log
(
CPIit
CPIjt
)
EMUrateijt =
∣∣∣EMUrateit − EMUratejt∣∣∣
nonEZTradeijt = log
(
T−EZit +T
−EZ
jt
T−jiEZt+T
−i
jEZt
)
1.3.2 Estimation Results with Quasicorrelation BCS Measure
In this section as I have a panel with T = 72 and N = 91, I restrict my methods
to POLS, FE and RE to compare the findings with the ones in the previous sections.30
Table 1.9 displays the results for Equation 1.7 where t ∈ T , and D1, D2, D3, and D4 are
dummy variables for each time period t ∈ T1, t ∈ T2, t ∈ T3, and t ∈ T4, respectively.
The results in Table 1.9 show that the effect of fiscal stance differences on bilateral BCS
changes across time periods, similar to the findings in the previous section. It is more
evident in the second and third column. The magnitude of the impact of bilateral FD
30GMM-IV method causes to lose efficiency with T=72 and N=91.
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displayed in column (1) and (2), on the other hand, is estimated to be smaller compared to
Column (1)-(2) in the Table 1.8.
The other finding that holds in current analysis is that differences in fiscal positions
increase bilateral BCS in the last period. The sign of the estimated coefficients in the last
period holds the same for three methods. However pooled OLS estimator is not statistically
significant.31 To summarize, the more divergent two countries are in terms of their fiscal
positions, the more synchronized their economies are in the last period of the sample.
One can - along the lines in Darvas et al. (2007) - interpret the divergences in fiscal
positions as a divergence in fiscal disciplines. However, differences in budget balance can
be divided into two measures; differences in primary balance and differences in net interest
payments. One country can run both primary surplus and budget deficit at the same
time if it inherits high amount of debt with high interest payments. Therefore analyzing
only budget balance values would be misleading to conclude that one country lacks fiscal
discipline at that current time. For this reason, I estimate the impact of bilateral primary
balance differences on the bilateral BCS. The results are displayed in Table 1.10.
Table 1.10 shows that the impact of differences in bilateral primary balance on the BCS is
statistically significant - slightly higher than estimates for the effect of differences in budget
balance in Table 1.9. Until the first quarter of 2013, this effect is significantly negative.
However in the last period, it is positive, which is consistent with the previous findings.
Moving Window Fixed Effects Regression
Switching to ”instantaneous” output correlation helps to analyze the dynamics, yet in
the previous section I still decide on the time periods for the dummies. Therefore next I
iteratively employ fixed effects regressions with a 20-quarter window. The equation that I
am interested is Equation 1.6 with primary balance differences as fiscal measure difference.
31R-squared values for POLS and FE also suggests that FE is better fit. Hausmann test for FE and RE
result in that FE model gives the consistent estimator. These values are not reported in the table
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Figure 1.4 shows the coefficient of primary balance difference, averaged over there groups
of country pairs: in the first row it is averaged among EZ 15 countries, in the second
row among Germany, France and Italy, and in the third row among Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal and Spain (GIIPS).
Looking at the first row of Figure 1.4 the coefficient of primary balance difference seems
to be negative most of the time with a positive trend at the end of the last period. However
it becomes positive just after the first quarter of 2016 which is different from the previous
findings.
Another interesting observation is that the biggest three economies in the EZ area, Ger-
many, France and Italy (GFI) have a very different pattern and magnitude for the impact
of primary balance difference on the bilateral BCS compared to overall mean (the first row)
and to the mean among GIIPS (the third row). Bilateral primary balance differences start
to reduce the synchronization among GFI after the first quarter of 2013 and have a nega-
tive sign until the second quarter of 2016. This time period overlaps with the times when
high fiscal austerity measures are taken. On the other hand, GIIPS starts to experience a
positive impact of fiscal stance difference in the same period.
To see the variation of the values among country pairs at each quarter, I add the coefficient
values of each country pair to the Figure 1.4, ending up with a new figure, Figure 1.5. In
the first row, I also add the band with a width of ±2xmeanoverN (std.err.), shown in blue
lines. It seems that the sign of the coefficient is ambiguous, however the variation over
country pairs decreases through time.
Similarly, the variation among GIIPS follows a similar pattern to overall EZ 15 countries,
and it declines through time. However, GFI experiences smaller variations between the
second quarter of 2009 and the first quarter of 2013 - right after the financial crisis erupts.
Following the second quarter of 2013, the variation of how much the fiscal position difference
affect bilateral BCS among GFI increases.
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Bilateral fiscal balance difference gives a measure for a fiscal stance divergence or conver-
gence. However it is not sufficient to suggest a national fiscal policy direction regardless of
being measured by either budget balance or primary balance. In fact one cannot infer an
answer for the question how an increase in government expenditure of country i affects the
bilateral BCS between country j as there is no one to one correspondence between changes
in the individual fiscal position and changes in bilateral fiscal position differences.32 Addi-
tionally it doesn’t take into account the direction of the changes. The conclusion that the
impact of fiscal balance difference becomes positive in the last period of time can be result
of the fact that the EZ countries improve their fiscal positions, and divergences occur when
they run surpluses. Therefore in the next section I propose a measure which takes into
account these shortcomings.
1.4 How does an increase in fiscal balance of country i affect
BCS between country i and j ?
Absolute differences in fiscal budget balance cannot answer this question. Here I propose
a measure that can give that information in the following steps:
Step 1: Fiscal stance measure for country i at time t is defined as newFDit =
∣∣FDit−T ∗∣∣
where T ∗ is a constant to be targetted.33
Step2: Fiscal stance sign dummies for country i at time t are defined as FDbit = 1 if
FDit < T
∗ , zero otherwise, and FDgit = 1 if FDit ≥ T ∗, zero otherwise.
Step 3: Fiscal stance measure below T ∗ for country i at time t is defined as newFDbit =
newFDit×FDbit. Similarly, fiscal stance measure above T ∗ for country i at time t is defined
32To make the argument clear assume that FDij goes down by 10%. However this may be the results of
two cases; the result of that country i decreases its balance by 10% or the result that country j increases its
balance by 10%. Also assume that fall in FD increases BCS between i and j. Therefore, we can conclude the
same thing about corr(GDPi, GDPj) if country i decreases its balance or country j increases its balance.
33It will be helpful in the following analysis where I discuss the divergence from the threshold of Stability
and Growth Pact.
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as newFDgit = newFDit × FDgit. This measure gives the magnitude and the direction of
the budget position for each country at time t.
Step 4: In a set-up where the whole period is divided into four sub-periods as in the
initial analysis, fiscal stance measure below T ∗ for country i for the period Tn is defined as
newFDbiTn =
1
Tn
∑
t newFD
b
it. Similarly, fiscal stance measure above T
∗ for country i for
the period Tn is defined as newFD
g
iTn
= 1Tn
∑
t newFD
g
it. n∈ 1, 2, 3, 4.
Step 5: For each country pair (i,j) and each period Tn, two fiscal stance measures are
defined; newFDbijTn = newFD
b
iTn
+newFDbjTn and newFD
g
ijTn
= newFDgiTn +newFD
g
jTn
.
The first one gives the sum of the mean of deficits (below T ∗) and the second one gives the
sum of the mean of surpluses (above T ∗).
To calculate newFDbijTn and newFD
g
ijTn
I use cyclically and seasonally adjusted budget
balance per GDP series like in the previous sections and I assume T ∗ = 0. Descriptive
statistics for new fiscal stance measure that are displayed in Table 1.3 suggest that similar to
the previous measures, the variation of the variable comes mostly from individual differences
among country pairs.
Alternatively, I also use cyclically and seasonally adjusted primary budget balance per
GDP. However, in this case, T ∗ = −3% as it is an imposed budget deficit threshold
by the Stability and Growth Pact in the EU area. It is denoted by newPrimebijTn and
newPrimegijTn
The first equation to be estimated is;
BCSijTn = β0 + β1newFD
g
ijTn
+ β1newFD
b
ijTn + Z
′
ijTnα+ uijTn (1.8)
where X can be either budget balance or primary balance and ZijTn is the vector of control
variables from the previous section.
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I use pooled OLS, 3SLS, and GMM-IV methods with country pair fixed effects. Unlike in
the previous section, the instrumental variables for fiscal measure variable are not bilateral
differences. In fact they are the sum for each country pair. The same gravity model
instruments are used for bilateral trade. Table 1.11 indicates that years left in government’s
term is a strong instrument for budget surplus, however, it has a negative sign (-0.226),
showing that as the government gets closer to the next election, the budget surplus increases.
Government political position is the strongest instrument for budget deficit, supporting that
as the ruling government is close to the left-wing ideology, budget deficit goes up (0.222).
Table 1.12 shows the estimation results. There are three main conclusions. First, if coun-
try i - symmetrically country j- implements an expansionary fiscal policy that increases the
budget deficit, BCS with country j falls (Each coefficient estimator of newFDb is signifi-
cantly negative, displayed in the second row). Secondly, if country i - symmetrically country
j - implements a contractionary fiscal policy that increases the budget surplus, BCS with
country i increases (Each coefficient estimator of newFDg is significantly positive, displayed
in the first row). However, thirdly, the magnitude of the impact of fiscal policies on BCS
significantly depends on whether the country is running a surplus or a deficit. In fact, a
contractionary fiscal policy in a country with a surplus has a bigger impact relative to a
same-size expansionary fiscal policy in a country with a deficit.
To see how the impact of the new fiscal measure changes across periods, I use interactive
time dummies in addition to above estimation and the results are shown in Table 1.13.
Impact of a rise in fiscal surplus is not consistently positive in all periods. As it becomes
insignificantly negative in some periods, it is not possible to certainly claim that its sign
significantly changes among periods, though. The impact of a rise in fiscal deficit, on
the other hand, significantly changes over time. It becomes positive in the last period,
suggesting that if country i adopts austerity measures and decreases its fiscal deficit, BCS
with country j decreases.
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Table 1.15 presents the estimators for primary balance measure. Similar to the results
with budget deficit, newFDb, an increase in primary deficit significantly decreases bilateral
BCS. However, the impact of primary surplus is not significant and consistently positive.
Moreover, primary deficit has a bigger impact on the synchronization relative to primary
surplus.
Ambiguity of the impact of primary surplus continues to exist at different periods as
shown in the first four rows of Table 1.16. The sign of coefficient estimators among different
estimation methods is inconsistent and insignificant. On the other hand, the impact of
primary deficit is consistently negative in the first three periods and significant for the first
and the third period for all methods of estimations (Table 1.16). In the last period, an
increase in primary deficit increases bilateral BCS.
1.5 Various Analysis on Different Measures for Bilateral BCS
and Differences in Fiscal Stance
1.5.1 Different Measures for Bilateral BCS
Following the previous literature34, I analyze the co-movements of manufacture produc-
tion, investment, consumption in percentages of national GDP and GNI. Investment and
consumption per GDP give non-government main macroeconomic aggregates. Manufacture
production cannot be taken as gauging aggregate economic activity in a country, however,
it gives partial but solely supply side of the economy. Gross national income on the other
hand gauge the production by the nationals, taking into account net taxes and subsidies
from abroad. All data series are HP filtered and bilateral correlations among EZ countries
are calculated.35
34See (i) Camacho et al., (2006); Haan and Inklaar, (2007) for industrial production (ii) Crucini et al.,
(2011); Kose et al., (2008) for consumption, investment (iii) Austeriou P. et al., (2015) for growth
35For data sources please see Appendix.
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Table 1.17 and Table 1.18 give the estimation results for equation 1.6 with new measures
for BCS as dependent variable. Fiscal (budget balance) differences among EZ countries
significantly lead to a decline in the co-movement of manufacture production, and the
co-movement of investment. However, the strong negative correlation doesn’t hold for co-
movement of the consumption.
1.5.2 Different measures for Differences in Fiscal Stance
In this section I break down fiscal budget balance data into cyclically adjusted total
government revenue and expenditure. As total revenue is believed to be more cyclical than
total expenditure, separating two is helpful to analyze less cyclical component of budget.
The columns (1)-(3) in Table 1.19 give the coefficient estimates for differences in total
revenue and differences in total expenditure.
Columns (4)-(6) in Table 1.19 give the results when the differences in government con-
sumption are used as a fiscal stance measure. Government consumption can be seen as a
discretionary fiscal policy tool compared to total government revenue and total government
expenditure. Positive coefficient of differences in government consumption expenditure can
be explained by the responsiveness of the monetary policy to the changes in government
expenditure.
1.6 Discussion of the Results
The first main result of the paper is as countries differ in their fiscal balances, BCS among
them decreases. This result is consistent with the results of pro-cyclical fiscal policies that
cause idiosyncratic fiscal shocks as mentioned by Darvas et al. (2005). However, the
literature on the fiscal policy spillovers provides an economical explanation, such as the
channels through which pro-cyclical fiscal policies can decrease the BCS in a monetary
union (Corsetti et al., 201014; Attinasi et al., 20175).
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Suppose that country i conducts an expansionary fiscal policy, increasing the fiscal diver-
gence with country j. Expansionary fiscal policy in country i increases not only the demand
for domestic goods in country i but also the demand for foreign goods in country j. Hence
in both countries, the output increases via international trade. However if the monetary
authority in country i responds to the rise in aggregate demand by increasing the interest
rate, country i experiences appreciation of its currency via free flow of capital. Foreign
goods in country j becomes relatively cheaper than the goods in country i. As a second
mechanism, this increases the demand for goods in country j. Both channels can cause a
rise in country j’s output while country i also is experiencing expansion. However, in a
monetary union, any monetary response to the rise in aggregate demand in country i also
affects the interest rate and the exchange rate in country j. Therefore, appreciation of the
common currency causes the demand for country j’s goods to drop. When country i may
benefit from a rise in aggregate demand by an expansionary fiscal policy in a monetary
union, aggregate demand, hence, output in country j may decline. BCS between country i
and j decreases which explains the main result of the paper; i.e., bilateral fiscal policy diver-
gence, or a reduction in budget surplus, or an increase in budget deficit decreases bilateral
BCS.
Suppose the case where the monetary authority cannot respond to the national fiscal
policy. For instance, if the official rates are already almost zero, the European Central
Bank cannot decrease the short-term interest rates as a response to the contractionary
national fiscal policies in the EZ area. Hence, the drop in demand for country j’s goods that
comes with a contractionary fiscal policy in country i, reduces country j’s output without
any offsetting force through the interest rates and exchange rates. Moreover, both countries
experience a rise in the real interest rates, decreasing the consumption levels. As a result
they both become subject to a decline in output, increasing the synchronization of their
business cycles.
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The above scenario actually explains the second result of the paper, i.e., in the last four
years of the sample, if there is an increase in fiscal balance and hence an increase in fiscal
divergences, BCS increases. This result is consistent with the picture of the euro zone
countries, undergoing fiscal consolidations while the official rates are almost zero.
On the other hand, the difference between the magnitude of the impact of fiscal policy in
case of running a surplus or a deficit can be explained by different expectations of consumers
in each situation. If country i runs a deficit and conducts an expansionary fiscal policy, due
to higher expectations on future contractionary fiscal policy, the inflationary effect of the
current expansionary fiscal policy will be less compared to the case where country i runs a
surplus. Therefore, the appreciation of the common currency will be less, affecting country
j’s aggregate demand less. Although there is a decline in BCS between country i and j for
both cases, when country i runs a deficit, the magnitude will be smaller.
1.7 Conclusion
Recent financial and sovereign crises in the euro area present an opportunity to investigate
the national fiscal policies as determinants of business cycle synchronization. In this paper,
I analyze the impact of bilateral differences in fiscal positions of the euro zone countries on
the bilateral synchronization of business cycles and how it changes across time periods.
I conduct a panel data analysis to examine possible causal association between bilateral
differences in budget balance positions and the business cycle synchronization (BCS), i.e.,
GDP correlations in the euro zone (EZ) area for 1999q1-2016q4. I analyze the dynamics
of the impact of fiscal position differences. I compute a bilateral measure for national
fiscal position which can reveal more information on how each national fiscal policy changes
bilateral BCS.
I find that the impact of differences in fiscal balance on BCS is negative in the euro area
for the whole time sample which aligns with pro-cyclical feature of fiscal policy Nonetheless,
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I observe that this impact is not linear. In fact, in the last period of the sample, bilateral
BCS increases with an increase in differences in fiscal balance. This result is consistent with
the notion (of counter-cyclical fiscal policy) that asymmetric national fiscal policies can be
implemented as a response to asymmetric shocks or to the same shocks with asymmetric
results, and helps to retain the stability.
I find that the magnitude of the fiscal policy impact on the BCS depends on whether the
country runs a surplus or a deficit. This result can be explained by different expectations
on future policy in case of a deficit and a surplus. However, here it is crucial to remind
that in the empirical model, there is no measure for the sustainability of the fiscal position
in which case different results can emerge. For instance, there is no mechanism to treat
country i, running one percent deficit and conducting an expansionary fiscal policy and
country j, running eight percent deficit and conducting the same size expansionary policy.
Although I attempt to measure the impact of fiscal policy via instrumental variables,
fiscal position variable still contains some endogeneity. It would be interesting to see the
effects of structural fiscal policies implemented in the euro area as a future study.
One should accept the explanation of the results with a caveat as it is assumed that
the ECB responds to each nation’s fiscal policy the same. However, it is necessary to
differentiate the impacts of the fiscal policies of big and small economies.
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1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Data Sources
Business Cycle Synchronization Measure Data
Real GDP: The raw data is obtained from OECD National Accounts Quarterly Data
set. US Dollar in Millions. OECD reference year 2010, fixed PPPs, annual level, seasonally
adjusted. I take the natural logarithm of the values and filter the data with HP method
where λ = 1600. As next step I calculate the correlation of the outputs for each country
pair.
Gross National Income: OECD National Accounts36 is the data source. It is in Millions
of US dollars and in annual frequency. I take the natural logarithm of the values and filter it
with HP method where λ = 100. Similar to GDP measure, I calculate pair-wise correlation
of GNI.
Industrial Production Index: OECD Revisions Analysis Dataset- Infra-annual Indi-
cators, Index of Industrial Production. Monthly frequency, base year is 2010. (indicator:
INDPROD, subject: TOT, measure: IDX2010, frequency: Q). λ I filter the industrial pro-
duction index. Then I calculate the correlation of the production indices of countries with
each other. Similarly, I follow the same steps for manufacture production index (INDPROD,
MFG, IDX2010,Q).
Consumption: Private final consumption expenditure is in millions US dollars volume
estimates PPPs OECD with reference year 2010. It is seasonally adjusted, quarterly data.
I take the natural logarithm of the data, then I filter it with HP method, and then calculate
the pair-wise correlations.
36OECD (2017), Gross national income (indicator). doi: 10.1787/8a36773a-en (Accessed on 21 June 2017)
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Investment: For gross capital formation: it is from OECD. The subject is Gross capital
formation. The measure is National Currency , chained volume estimates, national reference
year, quarterly levels, seasonally adjusted. The unit is Euro in Millions, the reference year
is 2010. Similarly I took the natural logarithm of the data then I filtered it with hp method.
calculated the correlations.
Unemployment: From OECD, Main Economic Indicator. Subject is labor force survey,
quarterly data, harmonized unemployment, monthly rates, all persons. The unit is in
percentages. I took the differences of unemployment rates of each country pair for each
quarter. Then I took the average of the absolute value of differences for the period that
is of interest. It gives the average unemployment rate difference between two countries for
that period.
Fiscal Policy Measure Data
Government Deficit: The raw data is collected from EuroStat, government statistics,
Non-financial account, general government. Net Lending/Borrowing (budget) is percentage
of GDP. Most of the series are seasonally and calendar adjusted. I adjust the unadjusted
series with moving average method, following the literature. The files can be provided upon
request. I remove cyclical output impacts from the series by cyclically adjusting following
OECD method.
Government Gross Debt: Quarterly gross government debt is collected from EuroStat
government statistics. The unit is percentage of GDP. I took the absolute difference for
each country pair for t and averaged it. I didn’t filter or seasonally adjust the data. Make
sure there is no trend in the data. This is a stock variable. It is important to know how the
raw data should be treated. The other point is the difference in this variable doesn’t give
deficit level. Net Lending/Borrowing and Gross Government Debt are not related. ESA
2010 deficit or surplus = net lending/borrowing. EDP government debt is defined as total
consolidated gross debt at face value (currency and deposits, debt securities and loans)
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Government Expenditure: Raw data for GDP and Government expenditures are col-
lected from EuroStat (Namq10gdp). The series are chain linked volumes ( reference year is
2010) in million Euros. They are seasonally and calendar adjusted data. For government
expenditure measure, I calculated government expenditure as a percentage of GDP. Then I
filtered the series with HP method. I took the absolute value of differences of government
spending for each country pair.
Bilateral Trade: Raw data is collected from IMF Direction of Trade Data base. The
export series gives value of exported goods in US dollars (free on board). The import series
gives the value of imported goods in million US Dollars (Cost insurance freight). Bilateral
trade flow for two countries are calculated as the total trade flow between these two countries
divided by their total trade volume with respect to the world. Then I take the mean for the
period and take the natural logarithm of it. I took the mean first because I didn’t want the
negatives and positives to cancel out each other. But I should try different method. Total
Trade Volume to the euro zone and the non-euro zone countries:
Current Account Balance: Balance of payments data from OECD statistics. I used
the current account per GDP values. Quarterly international trade statistics data set. I
took the absolute value of differences of current account balances of the countries. Then I
took the average of these differences for the period of interest.
Price Level Index: The harmonized consumer price index is from EuroStat. The base
year is 2005. For the price differences , I take the ratio of CPI for each country , then I
take the log of it and then I?took the average for the period.
Government Bond Yields Index: EMU convergence criterion series are quarterly data
for bond yields. The Maastricht Treaty EMU convergence criterion series relates to inter-
est rates for long-term government bonds denominated in national currencies. Selection
guidelines require data to be based on central government bond yields on the secondary
market, gross of tax, with a residual maturity of around 10 years. The bond or the bonds
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of the basket have to be replaced regularly to avoid any maturity drift. OECD Rates are
very similar. Still need to figure out the main difference. I took the absolute difference and
average it for the period.
Industrial Structure Similarity Eurostat data Gross value added and income A10
industry breakdowns (namq10a10) industries: Agriculture, Industry, Manufacturing, Con-
struction, Wholesale and retail trade, Information and communication, Financial and in-
surance activities, Real estate activities, Professional, scientific and technical activities; ad-
ministrative and support service, public administration, defence, education, human health
and social work , Arts, entertainment and recreation; other services activities.. They are
seasonally and calendar adjusted. They are percentages of GDP for each country.
Broad measures of fiscal stance: Total Revenue, Total Expenditure, Government Con-
sumption Expenditure, Net Interest Payments, Primary Balance, Tax revenues on produc-
tion and imports, income and wealth, and products, Social benefits, Compensation of em-
ployees, Subsdy, debt in terms of loans, debt securities, currency and deposits, short term
debt securities and loans, long term debt securities and loans.
Gravity variables: Geodist data set is from CEPII.
1.8.2 Cyclical Adjustment Method
I use the cyclical adjustment method that is one of the methods that are used by OECD
and European Commission (Mourre et al., 201337). The method has two steps. First the
output gap is estimated by Hodrick-Prescott filter. Secondly the cyclical budget balance
which is calculated by multiplying the output gap with the marginal rates of change of
net budget balance with respect to GDP is removed from the actual government budget
balance. The method is as the following;
BBcab = BBact − ε(Y act − Y pot
Y pot
)
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where BBcab is the cyclically adjusted budget balance per GDP, BBact is the actual budget
balance per GDP, ε is the marginal rates of change in net budget balance with respect to
GDP, Y act is actual GDP, Y pot is the potential GDP or trend components of GDP that is
calculated by HP filter. ε is computed by Mourre et al. (2014)36.
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1.8.3 Figures
Data Data Source Time Period
Frequency/Unit/Reference 
Year/Seasonally Adjusted
Real GDP
OECD National Accounts 
Quarterly Dataset
1999q1-2016q4
Quarterly, US Dollars, 
2010, Fixed PPPs, Annual 
level SA
Industrial Production 
Index
OECD Revisions Analysis 
Dataset
1999q1-2016q4
Monthly, Index, end of 
quarter values
Consumption 
OECD National Accounts 
Quarterly Dataset, Private 
Consumption
1999q1-2016q4
Quarterly, US Dollars, 
2010, Fixed PPPs, Annual 
level SA
Investment
OECD National Accounts 
Quarterly Dataset, Gross 
Capital Formation
1999q1-2016q4
Quarterly, National 
Currency, chained volume 
estimates
Unemployment
OECD Main Economic 
Indicator Dataset, Labor 
Force Survey
1999q1-2016q4
Quarterly, Harmonized in 
percentages, all persons
Government Deficit
EuroStat Government 
Statistics Non-financial 
account, Net 
Lending/Borrowing
1999q1-2016q3
Quarterly, GDP %, SA 
(author's calculation)
Government Gross 
Debt
EuroStat Government 
Statistics Non-financial 
account, Gross Debt
1999q1-2016q3
Quarterly, GDP %, Stock 
variable
Government 
Expenditure
Eurostat (Namq10gdp) 1999q1-2016q3
Quarterly, Mn Euros, 2010, 
Chain linked vol., SA 
calendar adjusted, GDP % 
Bilateral Trade Data
IMF Direction of Trade 
Dataset
1999q1-2016q3
Quarterly, US Dollars Mn, 
Export (free on board), 
Import (cost insurance 
Current Account 
Balance
OECD Balance of Payment 
statistics Dataset
1999q1-2016q3 Quarterly, GDP %
Price Level Index 
Eurostat Harmonized 
consumer price index
1999q1-2016q3
End of quarter values, 
Index, 2005, 
Government Bond 
Yields Index
Eurostat EMU 
convergence rates
1999q1-2016q3
End of quarter values, 
Index
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Figure 1.1: GDP movements and government budget balance for
Germany and Ireland
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Figure 1.2: GDP correlations and fiscal deficit differences for
1999Q1-2016Q4
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Figure 1.3: GDP correlations and fiscal balance differences for
1999Q1-2016Q4
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Figure 1.4: Mean of time-varying effect of primary balance
differences on bilateral BCS.
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Figure 1.5: Time-varying effect of primary balance differences on
bilateral BCS.
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In the first row, mean of time-varying effect over all country pairs is shown with
the red line. The blue lines give the band width of ∓2meanoverN (std.err.). Each
dot refers to the effect of primary balance difference for a country pair at each
quarter. Similarly, in the second row, the red line displays the mean of the
coefficient over country pairs of three countries; Germany, France, and Italy.
Hence each dot refers to the effect of primary balance difference for either
Germany and France, or France and Italy, or Germany and Italy. In the third
row, the graph is plotted with the same merit as the graph in the second row. It
includes, however, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
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1.8.4 Tables
Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
BCS
overall 0.5891 0.4165 -0.7572 0.9908 N = 420
between 0.2251 -0.1347 0.9024 n = 105
within 0.3509 -0.5368 1.4365 T = 4
FD
overall 4.1337 2.5290 0.5048 15.8435 N = 420
between 1.7093 1.3982 9.4886 n = 105
within 1.8695 -0.8768 13.0547 T = 4
Debt
overall 41.7506 29.1336 0.8125 164.9467 N = 420
between 25.9031 4.5372 124.2198 n = 105
within 13.5130 6.0570 82.4774 T = 4
Debtdiff
overall 2.1436 1.1736 0.2250 6.9278 N = 420
between 0.7535 0.6551 4.1092 n = 105
within 0.9020 -0.0175 5.6825 T = 4
BiTrade
overall -5.6349 1.5208 -9.8187 -2.6881 N = 420
between 1.5121 -8.9245 -2.7234 n = 105
within 0.2071 -6.5292 -5.0939 T = 4
nonEZvsEZTrade
overall 1.4332 1.0341 0.2747 6.6676 N = 420
between 1.0169 0.3317 5.3120 n = 105
within 0.2068 0.3575 2.7888 T = 4
CA
overall 6.7703 4.3426 0.6514 21.1996 N = 420
between 3.3332 1.7014 16.6698 n = 105
within 2.7977 -1.9215 15.1906 T = 4
CPI
overall 0.0439 0.0466 0.0021 0.2774 N = 420
between 0.0292 0.0074 0.1294 n = 105
within 0.0364 -0.0737 0.1919 T = 4
EMUrate
overall 1.3851 1.9851 0.0167 9.5567 N = 364
between 1.2146 0.0567 4.6247 n = 91
within 1.5740 -2.9512 6.3171 T = 4
SIP
overall -3.2755 6.2050 -21.6966 0.6594 N = 420
between 6.1998 -20.8565 0.5054 n = 105
within 0.5830 -4.9124 -1.5128 T = 4
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Table 1.2: Descriptive statistics of various fiscal measure variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
TE
overall 7.1980 4.3286 0.6500 23.3188 N = 420
between 3.8346 1.6054 17.9504 n = 105
within 2.0341 1.1698 14.5995 T = 4
TR
overall 6.7958 4.3480 0.6333 23.7188 N = 420
between 4.0914 0.9628 19.4639 n = 105
within 1.5118 2.7149 14.9522 T = 4
GOV
overall 2.8344 2.0169 0.2000 10.8813 N = 420
between 1.7536 0.5124 7.6139 n = 105
within 1.0072 -0.3996 6.5131 T = 4
Debtdiff
overall 2.1436 1.1736 0.2250 6.9278 N = 420
between 0.7535 0.6551 4.1092 n = 105
within 0.9020 -0.0175 5.6825 T = 4
Primebalance
overall 4.3668 2.0310 0.9438 14.0944 N = 420
between 1.2207 1.8374 8.1243 n = 105
within 1.6265 -0.4175 12.2807 T = 4
Ntintpay
overall 2.0258 1.3542 0.0625 6.8735 N = 420
between 1.1716 0.3169 5.4191 n = 105
within 0.6864 -0.4778 4.0945 T = 4
Prodimp
overall 2.9495 1.7330 0.3938 8.7000 N = 420
between 1.5226 0.7273 7.6718 n = 105
within 0.8375 0.9211 7.1918 T = 4
Incwlth
overall 4.1099 2.1795 0.4375 11.0050 N = 420
between 2.0919 1.1379 10.2019 n = 105
within 0.6366 2.2119 6.0159 T = 4
Prdcts
overall 2.0848 1.5541 0.2389 8.7000 N = 420
between 1.4364 0.3509 7.6718 n = 105
within 0.6056 0.2933 4.5089 T = 4
Socbnft
overall 4.3079 2.9436 0.6222 16.0310 N = 420
between 2.6407 0.8806 12.4917 n = 105
within 1.3197 -0.1365 9.4321 T = 4
STdebt
overall 4.0903 2.0377 0.3556 9.8333 N = 351
between 1.5833 1.1615 8.7324 n = 91
within 1.2948 1.1338 8.1981 bar = 3.85714
STloans
overall 1.7707 1.1936 0.2600 6.9722 N = 351
between 0.8688 0.3497 3.7240 n = 91
within 0.8180 -0.3801 5.9221 bar = 3.85714
LTdebt
overall 6.6922 2.6435 1.7600 18.1067 N = 351
between 1.7786 2.8879 11.7967 n = 91
within 2.0015 -0.6044 13.0023 bar = 3.85714
LTloans
overall 2.6576 2.8478 0.4222 13.7889 N = 351
between 1.6404 0.9788 7.5515 n = 91
within 2.3317 -3.3991 11.2513 bar = 3.85714
FDwrtSGP
overall 9.0087 10.4913 0.2112 102.4853 N = 420
between 6.5846 1.5273 37.4592 n = 105
within 8.1866 -17.4522 74.0348 T = 4
FDbelowSGP
overall 2.7336 3.4210 0.0000 20.7038 N = 420
between 1.9558 0.0553 8.6219 n = 105
within 2.8117 -2.9324 15.8177 T = 442
Table 1.3: Descriptive statistics of new fiscal measure variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
newFDb
overall 6.4424 4.4696 0.1296 26.7038 N = 420
between 2.6744 1.3031 13.2116 n = 105
within 3.5884 -1.2579 22.0125 T = 4
newFDg
overall 0.9293 1.3631 0.0000 7.7941 N = 420
between 0.9173 0.0000 3.9587 n = 105
within 1.0112 -2.1376 4.7648 T = 4
newPrimeb
overall 6.3452 4.6903 0.0000 27.8734 N = 420
between 3.2844 0.0610 15.2015 n = 105
within 3.3599 -1.2262 20.8029 T = 4
newPrimeg
overall 1.9138 2.5647 0.0000 13.9018 N = 420
between 2.0650 0.0000 9.0228 n = 105
within 1.5311 -3.3371 6.8390 T = 4
Table 1.4: Basic Model Estimation
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
FD -0.0525*** -0.0384*** -0.0506***
(0.00721) (0.00939) (0.00716)
D2 0.419*** 0.424*** 0.420***
(0.0380) (0.0385) (0.0381)
D3 0.157*** 0.143*** 0.155***
(0.0356) (0.0403) (0.0361)
D4 -0.0476 -0.0369 -0.0461
(0.0599) (0.0599) (0.0599)
Constant 0.674*** 0.615*** 0.666***
(0.0425) (0.0426) (0.0423)
Observations 420 420 420
R-squared 0.285 0.304
Number of pan id 105 105
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. They are clustered
by country pairs. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. D2, D3, and D4
refer to the time period dummies for 2004q1-2008q2, 2008q3-2012q4,
and 2013q1-2016q4, respectively.
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Table 1.5: POLS, FE, and RE estimations with control
variables
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
FD -0.0218*** -0.0180** -0.0218***
(0.00672) (0.00799) (0.00718)
BiTrade 0.0114 0.337*** 0.0114
(0.0124) (0.0832) (0.0117)
SIP -0.00189 0.0666*** -0.00189
(0.00227) (0.0206) (0.00204)
nonEZvsEZTrade -0.0343 0.568** -0.0343
(0.0479) (0.234) (0.0438)
CA Diff -0.0108*** -0.0184*** -0.0108***
(0.00366) (0.00510) (0.00374)
CPI -2.990*** -2.307*** -2.990***
(0.743) (0.756) (0.718)
EMUrate -0.0408*** -0.0104 -0.0408***
(0.0125) (0.0114) (0.0100)
D2 0.254*** 0.301*** 0.254***
(0.0481) (0.0484) (0.0431)
D3 0.101** 0.00982 0.101***
(0.0470) (0.0568) (0.0355)
D4 0.0765 -0.0601 0.0765
(0.0518) (0.0821) (0.0620)
Constant 0.911*** 2.878*** 0.911***
(0.0589) (0.417) (0.0556)
Observations 364 364 364
R-squared 0.441 0.489
Number of pan id 91 91
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. They are clustered
by country pairs. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. D2, D3, and D4
refer to the time period dummies for 2004q1-2008q2, 2008q3-2012q4,
and 2013q1-2016q4, respectively.
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Table 1.6: First stage OLS results of 3SLS
estimation for endogenous variables; fiscal
balance and bilateral trade.
OLS
VARIABLES FD BiTrade
GovtPoliticalPosition 0.694***
(0.170)
GovtsLeftTerm 1.719**
(0.762)
PowerDistribution 0.384
(0.432)
Working/Age over65 1.236
(1.028)
Distance -0.516***
(0.142)
Common Ethnicity 1.002**
(0.392)
Contagious 1.334***
(0.311)
GrowthDiff -0.0150
(0.102)
Constant -2.759 -2.355**
(1.715) (1.026)
Observations 200 200
R-squared 0.542 0.358
Number of group
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Country pair dummies
and period dummies are included but not reported.
45
Table 1.7: 3SLS, one-step GMM, and two-step GMM
estimations
IV GMM
VARIABLES 3SLS One-step Two-step
FD -0.0439*** -0.0385*** -0.0385***
(0.0146) (0.0107) (0.0127)
BiTrade 0.0374** 0.0493** 0.0507**
(0.0174) (0.0194) (0.0205)
SIP -0.0121*** -0.0117*** -0.0129***
(0.00438) (0.00363) (0.00355)
nonEZvsEZTrade -0.0892 -0.0958 -0.0976
(0.0702) (0.0798) (0.0825)
CA -0.0271*** -0.0301*** -0.0329***
(0.00758) (0.00751) (0.00917)
CPI -3.446*** -3.642*** -3.375***
(0.489) (0.476) (0.774)
Constant 1.049*** 1.127*** 1.116***
(0.0939) (0.101) (0.0966)
Observations 200 200 200
R-squared 0.501
Number of group 100 100
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses for GMM es-
timations. They are clustered by country pairs. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bilateral trade and fiscal measures are assumed
to be endogenous. Country pair dummies and period dummies
are included but not reported.
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Table 1.8: POLS, FE and 3SLS estimations with
interactive fiscal measure dummies
VARIABLES Pooled OLS Fixed Effects 3SLS
D1FD -0.0607*** -0.0582*** -0.274***
(0.0154) (0.0158) (0.0861)
D2FD -0.00678 0.0141 -0.0525
(0.00697) (0.0146) (0.0679)
D3FD -0.0394*** -0.0240*** 0.0222
(0.0100) (0.00872) (0.0432)
D4FD -0.00247 0.0425* 0.135**
(0.0157) (0.0229) (0.0675)
BiTrade 0.0352*** 0.172** 0.335
(0.0111) (0.0758) (0.251)
SIP -0.00522** 0.0909*** 0.101**
(0.00221) (0.0235) (0.0474)
nonEZvsEZTrade -0.0424 0.307 -0.341
(0.0507) (0.298) (0.370)
CA Diff -0.00911** -0.00811* 0.00408
(0.00372) (0.00469) (0.00908)
CPI -3.538*** -3.817*** -2.574***
(0.350) (0.484) (0.915)
Constant 0.898*** 1.778*** 3.330***
(0.0896) (0.451) (1.153)
Observations 420 420 335
R-squared 0.502 0.523 0.441
Number of group 105
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. They are clus-
tered by country pairs. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. D2,
D3, and D4 refer to the time period dummies for 2004q1-2008q2,
2008q3-2012q4, and 2013q1-2016q4, respectively. Bilateral trade
and fiscal measures with interactive dummies are assumed to be
endogenous.
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Table 1.9: POLS, FE and RE estimations with
quasi-correlation GDP.
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES POLS FE RE
FD 0.00975 0.0165** 0.0107**
(0.00726) (0.00638) (0.00547)
D1FD 0.0219 -0.0538*** -0.0509***
(0.0187) (0.0128) (0.0121)
D2FD -0.00616 -0.0493*** -0.0502***
(0.0249) (0.0168) (0.0153)
D3FD -0.0203* -0.0508*** -0.0482***
(0.0107) (0.00892) (0.00861)
BiTrade 0.0179 0.309*** 0.0398***
(0.0191) (0.0739) (0.0153)
SIP -0.00128 0.00301 0.00189
(0.00202) (0.00347) (0.00158)
nonEZvsEZTrade -0.215*** -0.278 -0.0273
(0.0706) (0.265) (0.0673)
CA Diff -0.000107 -0.000180** -0.000192***
(8.09e-05) (7.43e-05) (7.33e-05)
CPI -0.911 1.416*** 1.263***
(0.549) (0.444) (0.469)
EMUrate -0.0269 0.673*** 0.673***
(0.0474) (0.0256) (0.0258)
D1 0.165 -1.504*** -1.453***
(0.190) (0.0943) (0.0784)
D2 0.438** -0.229*** -0.138*
(0.179) (0.0862) (0.0776)
D3 0.194 0.151** 0.173**
(0.125) (0.0750) (0.0853)
Constant 0.557*** 2.104*** 0.552***
(0.110) (0.482) (0.0868)
Observations 6,259 6,317 6,317
R-squared 0.022 0.259
Number of group 91 91
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. They are clus-
tered by country pairs. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. D2,
D3, and D4 refer to the time period dummies for 2004q1-2008q2,
2008q3-2012q4, and 2013q1-2016q4, respectively.
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Table 1.10: POLS, FE and RE estimations with
quasi-correlation GDP for primary balance and net interest
payments differences.
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES POLS FE RE
Primbalance 0.0130** 0.0181*** 0.0152***
(0.00541) (0.00603) (0.00563)
Ntintpay -0.0627*** -0.0455*** -0.0545***
(0.0128) (0.0159) (0.0124)
D1Primbalance -0.0493*** -0.0485*** -0.0502***
(0.00974) (0.0102) (0.00987)
D2Primbalance -0.0208 -0.0212* -0.0203
(0.0128) (0.0126) (0.0126)
D3Primbalance -0.0299*** -0.0329*** -0.0312***
(0.00619) (0.00712) (0.00648)
BiTrade 0.0284* 0.300*** 0.0420***
(0.0144) (0.0741) (0.0153)
SIP 0.00138 0.00323 0.00178
(0.00161) (0.00356) (0.00174)
nonEZvsEZTrade -0.00361 -0.298 -0.0354
(0.0652) (0.258) (0.0687)
CA Diff -0.000205*** -0.000181** -0.000191***
(7.32e-05) (7.50e-05) (7.39e-05)
CPI 1.217*** 1.404*** 1.243***
(0.456) (0.442) (0.461)
EMUrate 0.674*** 0.673*** 0.673***
(0.0247) (0.0242) (0.0246)
D1 -1.442*** -1.517*** -1.444***
(0.0705) (0.0880) (0.0703)
D2 -0.238*** -0.330*** -0.247***
(0.0649) (0.0746) (0.0629)
D3 0.0837 0.0616 0.0840
(0.0758) (0.0639) (0.0733)
Constant 0.600*** 2.123*** 0.650***
(0.0889) (0.479) (0.0903)
Observations 6,317 6,317 6,317
R-squared 0.252 0.255
Number of group 91 91
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. They are clus-
tered by country pairs. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. D2,
D3, and D4 refer to the time period dummies for 2004q1-2008q2,
2008q3-2012q4, and 2013q1-2016q4, respectively.
49
Table 1.11: First stage OLS results of 3SLS estimation
OLS
VARIABLES newFDg newFDb BiTrade
GovPosition -0.0334 0.222**
(0.0324) (0.0903)
Working/Age +65 -0.00604 -0.0150
(0.0195) (0.0544)
GovtsLeftTerm -0.226*** 0.174
(0.0562) (0.156)
PowerDistribution 0.187 -0.181
(0.131) (0.365)
Distance -0.617***
(0.123)
Common Ethnicity 0.759**
(0.332)
Contagious 1.357***
(0.268)
Constant 0.481 3.943* -1.501*
(0.727) (2.025) (0.898)
Observations 279 279 279
R-squared 0.510 0.482 0.383
Number of group
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Time and country pair dummies are included
in the estimation but not reported. As the new fiscal mea-
sure is addition of the fiscal measures for country pairs (not
fiscal divergence), accordingly the instrumental variables are
addition of the values of each instrument for country pairs.
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Table 1.12: POLS, 3SLS and GMM-IV estimations
with new fiscal stance measures.
VARIABLES POLS 3SLS GMM-IV
newFDg 0.0379*** 0.0567** 0.0346*
(0.0105) (0.0260) (0.0190)
newFDb -0.0199*** -0.0390*** -0.0422***
(0.00446) (0.00834) (0.00693)
BiTrade 0.0422*** 0.0477*** 0.0420***
(0.0114) (0.0147) (0.0146)
SIP 0.00381 0.0101** 0.00891**
(0.00246) (0.00458) (0.00447)
nonEZvsEZTrade -0.129** -0.0736 -0.0489
(0.0512) (0.0642) (0.0628)
CA Diff -0.0136*** -0.0138*** -0.0129**
(0.00341) (0.00520) (0.00550)
CPI -4.047*** -3.929*** -4.164***
(0.374) (0.444) (0.463)
Constant 1.135*** 1.193*** 1.195***
(0.0685) (0.0896) (0.0891)
Observations 420 279 279
R-squared 0.505 0.533
Number of group 84
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. They are
clustered by country pairs. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Time and country pair dummies are included in the estima-
tion but not reported.
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Table 1.13: POLS, 3SLS and GMM-IV estimations with
time dummy interactions of new fiscal stance measures.
(1) (2) -3
VARIABLES POLS 3SLS GMM-IV
D1newFDg -0.0217 -0.0158 0.0137
(0.0173) (0.0469) (0.0143)
D2newFDg -0.00455 -0.0265 0.00879
(0.0147) (0.0543) (0.0115)
D3newFDg 0.110* -0.272** 0.101**
(0.0619) (0.136) (0.0491)
D4newFDg 0.0882 -0.0629 0.0385
(0.0594) (0.217) (0.0701)
D1newFDb -0.0965*** -0.111*** -0.0753***
(0.0147) (0.0317) (0.0151)
D2newFDb -0.00783 -0.105*** -0.000145
(0.00744) (0.0400) (0.00733)
D3newFDb -0.0260*** -0.0748*** -0.0509***
(0.00688) (0.0184) (0.00651)
D4newFDb 0.0718*** 0.0743*** 0.0725***
(0.00920) (0.0277) (0.00835)
BiTrade 0.0587*** 0.0316** 0.0449***
(0.0113) (0.0143) (0.00810)
nonEZvsEZTrade -0.0866 0.0476 0.0371
(0.0574) (0.0661) (0.0376)
CA Diff -0.00964** -0.00632 -0.00839***
(0.00371) (0.00543) (0.00290)
CPI -2.845*** -2.474*** -3.261***
(0.463) (0.638) (0.411)
SIP -0.00101 0.00383 0.00600***
(0.00264) (0.00494) (0.00202)
Constant 0.543*** 0.299 0.459***
(0.101) (0.215) (0.0841)
Observations 420 279 279
R-squared 0.637 0.609
Number of group 84
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. They are
clustered by country pairs. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
D2, D3, and D4 refer to the time period dummies for 2004q1-
2008q2, 2008q3-2012q4, and 2013q1-2016q4, respectively. Time
and country pair dummies are included but not reported.
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Table 1.14: First stage OLS results of 3SLS estimation with
new fiscal measure.
OLS
VARIABLES newPrimeg newPrimeb BiTrade
GovPosition -0.0643 0.178**
(0.0479) (0.0827)
Working/Age +65 -0.0313 0.0159
(0.0289) (0.0498)
GovtsLeftTerm -0.274*** 0.0862
(0.0831) (0.143)
PowerDistribution 0.290 0.358
(0.193) (0.334)
Distance -0.621***
(0.123)
Common Ethnicity 0.758**
(0.332)
Contagious 1.353***
(0.268)
Constant 0.902 2.832 -1.476
(1.075) (1.854) (0.897)
Observations 279 279 279
R-squared 0.665 0.634 0.383
Number of group
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Time and country pair dummies are included in the esti-
mation but not reported. As the new fiscal measure is addition of
the fiscal measures for country pairs (not fiscal divergence), accord-
ingly the instrumental variables are addition of the values of each
instrument for country pairs.
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Table 1.15: POLS, 3SLS and GMM-IV estimations
with new fiscal stance measures.
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES POLS 3SLS GMM-IV
newPrimeg 0.00433 0.0193 -0.00323
(0.00667) (0.0144) (0.0112)
newPrimeb -0.0256*** -0.0359*** -0.0443***
(0.00426) (0.00688) (0.00583)
BiTrade 0.0329*** 0.0313** 0.0239*
(0.0105) (0.0142) (0.0144)
SIP 0.00346 0.0102** 0.00656
(0.00250) (0.00500) (0.00480)
nonEZvsEZTrade -0.0789* -0.0490 -0.0101
(0.0465) (0.0618) (0.0616)
CA Diff -0.0116*** -0.0119** -0.0107*
(0.00300) (0.00513) (0.00547)
CPI -3.897*** -3.534*** -3.895***
(0.352) (0.422) (0.451)
Constant 1.086*** 1.013*** 1.059***
(0.0663) (0.0795) (0.0821)
Observations 420 279 279
R-squared 0.521 0.558
Number of group 84
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. They are
clustered by country pairs. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Time and country pair dummies are included in the estima-
tion but not reported.
54
Table 1.16: POLS, 3SLS, and GMM-IV estimations
with time dummy interactions of new fiscal stance
measures.
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES POLS 3SLS GMM-IV
D1newPrimeg -0.0203** 0.00706 -0.0150
(0.00877) (0.0229) (0.0103)
D2newPrimeg 0.00314 -0.000446 0.00656
(0.00654) (0.0293) (0.00596)
D3newPrimeg -0.00407 -0.0775 -0.0292*
(0.0240) (0.0787) (0.0175)
D4newPrimeg -0.00385 -0.0312 -0.0252
(0.0202) (0.0551) (0.0204)
D1newPrimeb -0.0889*** -0.0982*** -0.0970***
(0.0107) (0.0209) (0.0107)
D2newPrimeb -0.00104 -0.0411 0.000116
(0.00485) (0.0273) (0.00549)
D3newPrimeb -0.0347*** -0.0599*** -0.0587***
(0.00784) (0.0161) (0.00647)
D4newPrimeb 0.0354*** 0.0505** 0.0352***
(0.00937) (0.0219) (0.00975)
BiTrade 0.0413*** 0.0351*** 0.0262***
(0.00948) (0.0133) (0.0102)
nonEZvsEZTrade -0.0536 -0.00323 0.0171
(0.0464) (0.0561) (0.0370)
CA Diff -0.00723** -0.00436 -0.00345
(0.00317) (0.00542) (0.00232)
CPI -3.546*** -3.461*** -3.539***
(0.359) (0.358) (0.243)
SIP -0.000187 0.00392 0.00520***
(0.00224) (0.00504) (0.00190)
Constant 0.736*** 0.548*** 0.631***
(0.1000) (0.158) (0.0908)
Observations 420 279 279
R-squared 0.641 0.668
Number of group 84
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. They
are clustered by country pairs. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. D2, D3, and D4 refer to the time period dummies for
2004q1-2008q2, 2008q3-2012q4, and 2013q1-2016q4, respec-
tively. Time and country pair dummies are included but not
reported.
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Table 1.17: POLS, FE and 3SLS estimations with different BCS measures
Manufacture Production Investment
VARIABLES POLS FE 3SLS POLS FE 3SLS
FD -0.0431*** -0.0349*** -0.0571*** -0.0223*** -0.00835 -0.0436***
(0.00655) (0.00766) (0.00933) (0.00592) (0.00751) (0.00883)
BiTrade 0.00773 -0.00318 -0.00927 0.0568*** 0.188** 0.0291***
(0.0108) (0.0772) (0.0118) (0.0113) (0.0732) (0.0112)
SIP -0.00237 0.0561** -0.000506 0.00666*** 0.0873*** 0.00582**
(0.00220) (0.0234) (0.00262) (0.00206) (0.0254) (0.00248)
nonEZvsEZTrade 0.0961** 0.431 0.0966** -0.0442 0.103 -0.0233
(0.0447) (0.293) (0.0477) (0.0440) (0.267) (0.0451)
CA Diff -2.75e-05 -0.00255 0.00202 -0.00391 -0.00641 -0.000541
(0.00342) (0.00537) (0.00416) (0.00336) (0.00477) (0.00393)
CPI -2.396*** -2.576*** -2.674*** -1.058*** -0.705* -1.312***
(0.381) (0.485) (0.373) (0.385) (0.394) (0.352)
Constant 0.807*** 0.938** 0.470*** 0.745*** 1.681*** 0.659***
(0.0582) (0.445) (0.0650) (0.0544) (0.404) (0.0615)
Observations 420 420 348 420 420 348
R-squared 0.503 0.551 0.532 0.403 0.363 0.443
Number of pan id 105 105
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. They are clustered by country pairs. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. D2, D3, and D4 refer to the time period dummies for 2004q1-2008q2, 2008q3-2012q4, and
2013q1-2016q4, respectively.
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Table 1.18: POLS, FE and 3SLS estimations with different BCS measures
Consumption National Income
VARIABLES POLS FE 3SLS POLS FE 3SLS
FD -0.00643 -0.00992 0.00220 -0.0342*** -0.0100 -0.0603***
(0.00679) (0.00808) (0.0126) (0.0111) (0.0148) (0.0181)
BiTrade 0.0380** 0.346*** 0.0228 0.0635*** 0.361*** 0.0364
(0.0148) (0.0829) (0.0159) (0.0189) (0.126) (0.0229)
SIP 0.00894*** 0.0623** 0.00426 -0.00626* -0.0606 -0.00959*
(0.00306) (0.0263) (0.00353) (0.00351) (0.0440) (0.00509)
nonEZvsEZTrade -0.0157 -0.496 -0.00434 -0.0651 -0.115 0.0722
(0.0583) (0.336) (0.0643) (0.0892) (0.506) (0.0928)
CA Diff -0.0112** -0.0126** -0.0150*** -0.0199*** -0.00826 -0.0210***
(0.00493) (0.00568) (0.00561) (0.00628) (0.00969) (0.00807)
CPI -0.992** -1.186** -0.191 1.595* 2.803*** 0.996
(0.500) (0.492) (0.502) (0.851) (0.972) (0.723)
Constant 0.540*** 2.441*** 0.625*** 0.875*** 2.155*** 0.485***
(0.0912) (0.459) (0.0877) (0.0915) (0.694) (0.126)
Observations 420 420 348 420 420 348
R-squared 0.281 0.344 0.263 0.327 0.387 0.329
Number of pan id 105 105
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. They are clustered by country pairs. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. D2, D3, and D4 refer to the time period dummies for 2004q1-2008q2, 2008q3-2012q4, and
2013q1-2016q4, respectively.
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Chapter 2
The Optimal Timing of Fiscal
Consolidation Around the Zero
Lower Bound
2.1 Introduction
Aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008, the economies of the United States, and
the United Kingdom are distressed with high levels of debt which were resulted from the
expansionary fiscal policies in 2008 and beyond (Figure 2.1). The reason that these countries
relied heavily on fiscal policy was that with the financial crash, the policy interest rates
reached to minimum levels, i.e., zero lower bound, leaving no room for monetary policy
(Figure 2.2). In 2011 when this paper was written, the UK started fiscal consolidation
rather earlier than the US. The critics of this early retrenchment pointed out the possibility
of slowing down the economy even further when the interest rates were so close to zero.
Whereas, in the US, the condition of the economy was downgraded due to the doubts in
sustainability of high levels of debt whilst the fiscal consolidation wasn’t seen in the horizon.
Currently the zero lower bound is not binding for the US anymore1 and the Bank of
England is signalling the possibility of rising the official rates sooner.2 However, the European
1Federal Reserve FOMC statement https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary
20170614a.htm
2In June 2017, the monetary policy committee decided to keep the rates at its lowest point with a three out of
eight votes for a rise to keep inflation as targeted https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/jun/15/bank-
of-england-uk-interest-rates-inflation
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Central Bank (ECB) still keeps the lower rates in the second period of 2017 (Figure 2.2)
and announces they will remain unchanged ”...for an extended period of time, and well past
the horizon of the net asset purchases.”3 Moreover, in this economic environment, the euro
zone countries are adopting fiscal austerity measures which makes the research on the fiscal
consolidation and its timing around the zero lower bound still relevant.
In this paper I study different timing of future fiscal consolidation once the economy is hit
by a large recessionary demand shock and the interest rate endogenously falls to the zero
lower bound (ZLB). I compare the impacts of early and late fiscal consolidations by analyzing
the fluctuations in the economy, such as the duration of ZLB, output and consumption level,
labor supply and so on. I also study the welfare gains (loss) in case of different timing of
government spending reversals. I allow the interest rate endogenously to hit the ZLB and
then endogenously to exit the ZLB. Therefore, the duration that the economy stays at the
ZLB is also endogenously determined.
In the baseline model, I borrow the perfect foresight New-Keynesian closed economy
model with sticky prices a la Calvo, following Corsetti et al. (2010)19. The economy is hit
by a negative time preference shock which is a standard way to generate a drop in aggregate
demand and the ZLB becomes endogenously binding. Government spending increases
for eight quarters to stimulate the economy. Some time after the end of fiscal stimulus,
government expenditure drops below the steady state levels to do the fiscal retrenchment
with the same amount of initial fiscal expansion. Government spending is financed by debt
so that lump-sum tax is constant. In the baseline set up there is no distortionary taxation.
Time between the end of fiscal stimulus and the beginning of the fiscal retrenchment is
defined as time gap. I analyze the effect of current and future fiscal policy and study
welfare implications for different time gap values. Both stimulus and future consolidation
are known to the public at the time of the demand shock and policy is conducted under full
commitment.
3Monetary policy decisions http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2017/html/ecb.mp170608.en.html
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In the second part of the paper, I augment the model with fiscal rules. I utilize automatic
stabilizer coefficients, estimated for the US economy by Leeper et al. (2010)44. In this set
up, the fiscal tools such as lump-sum tax or labor income tax or government spending
are endogenously determined by the output level and the debt to output ratio. Fiscal
retrenchment refers to the additional government spending cuts some time after the increase
in government spending.
In parallel to the findings of many theoretical and empirical results (Eggertsson, 200125;
Eggertsson, 201126; Parker, 201150), I first show that the magnitude of the effect of the fiscal
policy depends on whether the economy is at the ZLB. For instance, if the nominal interest
rate is at the ZLB, the deflationary effect of reducing the government spendings increases
the real interest rate, i.e., the relative cost of current consumption which results in further
contraction in the economy.
Government spending cuts have contractionary effect on output at the time of implemen-
tation. Nevertheless, similar to the findings of Corsetti et al. (2010)19 and Corsetti et al.
(2012)18, I show that future government spending cuts may amplify the stimulating effect of
today’s fiscal expansion, depending on time gap between the expansion and the cuts. The
intuition behind this result is as follows: future government spending cuts imply a decline in
aggregate demand and the price level. If the economy is at the ZLB when future government
spending reversal takes place, the fall in price level increases future real interest rate which
reduces future consumption and output. If the fiscal contraction comes some time after
the recovery of the economy such that nominal interest rate is sufficiently away from the
ZLB, (hence the monetary policy has room to respond to deflationary effect of spending
cuts by reducing the nominal interest rate) this will lower future real interest rate and hence
increases future consumption and current consumption through consumption smoothing.
Therefore, the fiscal stimulus that is followed by an anticipated future fiscal contraction that
comes in a timely manner has bigger positive impact on the economy.
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To determine when to implement government spending cuts, I perform welfare analysis.
In the baseline set up, the optimal time gap to do the fiscal retrenchment is three years after
the end of fiscal stimulus. The cuts that are implemented just after the end of the stimulus
are not welfare-improving. In fact, welfare cost of doing the fiscal retrenchment earlier is
much higher than welfare cost of delaying it to later periods.
I find that the amplification of current fiscal stimulus by future government spending
cuts is stronger when the lump-sum tax plays a role as an automatic stabilizer. Yet this
still depends on the time gap. If lump-sum tax responds to the output and the debt to
output ratio, future government spending cuts, implemented at the optimal period, imply
not only lower future real interest rate both also lower lump-sum tax which increases future
consumption, today’s consumption and the output even further.
Similarly, if distortionary income tax endogenously responds to output and debt to output
ratio, the amplification effect of future spending cuts at the optimal time period on current
stimulus will be mitigated. This stems from the fact that future spending cuts increase
future consumption further because of the lower real interest rate and the lower income tax
rate. This helps the economy exit from the ZLB earlier. Therefore, the monetary policy can
effectively increase the nominal interest rate in response to the additional consumption rise
due to future government spending and consequently amplification effect is weaken.
Last but not least, I show that if government spending cuts endogenously determined by
output and debt to output ratio, the spending reversal has insignificant stimulating effect.
Moreover, if the government cuts spending further in addition to the endogenous spending
reversal, the welfare gain from additional spending cuts is negligible. Spending cuts at the
optimal timing is as welfare costly as not implementing it.
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There has been a growing interest in the fiscal multipliers4, the zero lower bound5 and the
effectiveness of the fiscal policy at the zero lower bound6 aftermath of the financial crash in
2008.7 My paper contributes to the literature, focusing on the future fiscal consolidation as
an exit strategy from expansionary fiscal policies during the crisis, its interaction with the
zero lower bound, and the timing of the fiscal consolidation. Unlike other studies, I search
for the optimal timing of the fiscal consolidation at the ZLB. I also augment the model with
different fiscal rules, allowing distortionary and automatic fiscal stabilization mechanisms.
In the literature there are studies with models of endogenously binding ZLB (Corsetti et
al.(2010)19;Nakata (2016, 2017)47nakata2017optimal; Eggertsson and Singh (2016)29). In my
paper I follow Corsetti et al. (2010)19. Although Corsetti et al. (2010) also demonstrates the
importance of the timing of the future fiscal consolidation, differently I analyze the welfare
implications of the timing, rather than only focusing on the impact multiplier. I obtain the
optimal timing of future fiscal consolidation in extent of the specifications of the presumed
fiscal rules.89
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Next section presents the model and calibration.
Section 3 analyzes impulse responses and performs welfare analysis. Section 4 studies different
fiscal rules such as lump-sum taxation, distortionary income taxation, and government
spending rule. Section 5 concludes.
4Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2007)36; Monacelli and Perotti (2008)46; Ramey (2011)53; Woodford
(2011)61; Christiano et al. (2011)15
5Swanson and Williams (2014)59; Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2015)34; Lim and McNelis (2016)45; Flotho
(2017)35
6Eggertsson (2001)25; Wieland (2014)60; Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2009)14; Corsetti et al.
(2010)19, Corsetti et al. (2012)18; Eggertsson (2011)26; Eggertsson and Krugman (2012)28; Erceg and Linde
(2014)33
7For fiscal multipliers in a ”Real Business Cycle” setting, see Baxer and King (1993)5; Aiyagari, Christiano
and Eichenbaum (1992)4; Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004)13
8There are also papers, demonstrating the timing and the size of fiscal consolidation such as Blanchard
and Leigh (2013)9. However, they do not study the welfare implications.
9Schmidt (2013)55; Nakata et al. (2011)48; Paltalidis (2017)49 also study the optimal fiscal policy which
the timing of the optimal fiscal policy can be inferred.
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2.2 The Model
I start my analysis with a standard New-Keynesian model with sticky prices a la Calvo
in the product market. There are infinite number of households indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Each
maximizes expected life-time utility over consumption Ci,t and hours of work Nit ;
max
Ct,Nt,bt
Et
∞∑
s=0
et+sβ
s
[
logCi,t+s − χ
N1+ωi,t+s
1 + ω
]
(2.1)
subject to the budget constraint.
Ci,t + Ti,t + bi,t = Ni,twt + bi,t−1
Rt−1
pit
+Di,t (2.2)
where χ, ω > 0, β denotes the time discount factor and et is the demand shock which
provides a mechanism for the binding ZLB in the economy. wt denotes the real wage rate.
bt equals to
Bt
Pt
and Bt denotes nominal government bonds with a nominal gross return rate
Rt.pit is the inflation rate
Pt
Pt−1 .Dt denotes dividends from the firms, Tt denotes net lump-sum
taxes. Ct denotes Dixit-Stiglitz consumption bundle of differentiated goods Cj,t with the
price level, Pj,t, for each good j ∈ [0, 1].
Ci,t =
(∫ 1
0
C
ε−1
ε
j,t dj
) ε
ε−1
Since the households have the same preferences, I drop the index i for each household
who has the following demand for each differentiated good Cj,t.
Cj,t =
(
Pj,t
Pt
)−ε
Ct
Hence the aggregate price level in the economy is Pt
10.
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
P 1−εj,t dj
) 1
1−ε
(2.3)
The demand shock hits the economy and the discount factor rises below one persistently
enough to make the ZLB start binding. The stream of preference shock to the growth rate
10The aggregate price index and the demand function of each household can be found by cost-minimization;
min PtCt st. Ct =
(∫ 1
0
C
ε
ε−1
j,t dj
) ε−1
ε
.
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of e, i.e., edt ≡ et+1et , follows an exogenous stream {εed,t}
∞
t=0.
The Euler Equation from the households maximization problem gives;
Et
[
βRt
pit+1
edt
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−1]
= 1 (2.4)
The labor supply decision is given by;
χNωt = C
−1
t wt (2.5)
In the production side there are infinite number of monopolistic competitive firms indexed
by j ∈ [0, 1]. Each has a linear production function;
Yj,t = ZNj,t
where Z is the production technology which is constant. Each faces demand from
households and government. As government spending, Gt is isomorphic to Ct, the demand
for each product is;
Yj,t(Pj,t) =
(
Pj,t
Pt
)−ε
Yt, where Yt = Ct +Gt
Instead of working through the linearized New-Keynesian Phillips curve, I follow the
model of Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004)56 (SGU(2004))which allows non-linear analysis.
The firms set the optimal price level,
∼
P j,t with probability 1− θ. The firms that cannot set
the optimal price level adjust the previous period price level with steady state inflation level.
∼
P j,t is the price level which maximizes the present discounted value of future profits and
hence equal to
∼
P j,t ≡ arg max
Pj,t
Et
∞
i=oqt,t+iθ
i
[
Yj,t+i(Pj,t)Pj,t
Pt+i
− wt+iYj,t+i(Pj,t)
Z
]
where qt,t+i is the stochastic discount factor of the firms. The relative optimal price level is
denoted by P ∗j,t ≡
∼
P j,t/Pt. Following SGU (2004), the optimal price level expression can be
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written as11
Ft = P
∗1−ε
t Yt +
pit+1
Rt
θ
(
P ∗t
P ∗t+1pit+1
)1−ε
Ft+1 (2.6)
Ht =
wt
Z
P ∗−εt Yt +
pit+1
Rt
θ
(
P ∗t
P ∗t+1pit+1
)−ε
Ht+1 (2.7)
such that
Ft =
ε
ε− 1Ht (2.8)
As a result of resource constraint the aggregate production in the economy is equal to
the aggregate demand. ∫ 1
0
Yj,tdj =
∫ 1
0
(
Pj,t
Pt
)−ε
Ytdj
After replacing the production function and
∫ 1
0 Nj,tdj = Nt, I get
ZNt = YtSt (2.9)
where St ≡
∫ 1
0
(
Pj,t
Pt
)−ε
dj is the price dispersion. Backward iteration of the price dispersion
gives12;
St = (1− θ) (P ∗t )−ε + θ
(pit
pi
)ε
St−1 (2.10)
If the firms cannot set the optimal price, they update the price level with the steady
state inflation rate, pi.13 This fact combined with the aggregate price index equation (3)
gives;
1 = (1− θ) (P ∗t )1−ε + θ
(
pi
pit
)1−ε
(2.11)
Government issues bonds Bt which pays real interest rate Rt, collects lump-sum taxes,
Tt and make expenditures Gt.
bt + Tt = bt−1
Rt−1
pit
+Gt (2.12)
As a fiscal policy rule, government spendings and lump-sum taxes may respond to the
11See Appendix A for the derivations of the FOCs.
12See Appendix A for the backward iteration.
13In the model the distortion at the steady state level due to the monopolistic competition is not subsidized,
the price stability may not necessarily be optimal which makes the assumption of non-zero inflation at the
steady state less arguable.
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output and debt level deviations from the target values as well as the fiscal shocks.
log(Gt/G) = φgb log(bt−1/B) + φgy log(Yt/Y ) + εg,t (2.13)
log(Tt/T ) = φTb log(bt−1/B) + φTy log(Yt/Y ) (2.14)
φgy ≤ 0 implies that an expansionary fiscal policy is enacted in case of a fall in output
and φgb ≤ 0 implies that as the expansionary fiscal policy is debt-financed, there should be
government spendings reversals in the future, keeping everything else constant. Similarly
φTb, φTy ≥ 0 implies that the net lump-sum taxes are procyclical and are used to correct
budget imbalances.
The nominal policy rate is determined by simple Taylor14
log
(
R∗t
R
)
= φpi log
(pit
pi
)
(2.15)
where φpi > 1, R = pi/β, pit = Pt/Pt−1. However, the nominal interest rate may be
bounded below by the ZLB. Hence the nominal interest rate in the economy is
Rt = max (1, R
∗
t ) (2.16)
Equation 2.2 - Equation 2.16 give a system of 15 equations with 15 variables {Ct,Nt,bt,
Yt,Gt,Tt ,wt, P
∗
t ,pit,St,Rt,R
∗
t ,edt,Ft,Ht} with {εe,t, εg,t} exogenous variables. Following Corsetti
et al. (2010) the nonlinear system of equations is solved by stacked-time Newton-Raphson
algorithm (originally Hollinger (1996)38) rather than log-linearization method.15
2.2.1 Calibration
Before describing the structural and policy parameters, it is worth to give some descriptive
statistics about the US economy before and during the great recession. Annual federal funds
rate has a mean of 4.3% for the time period 1990Q1-2008Q3. The rate started to fall below 5
base points in the fourth quarter of 2008 and stayed below 0.2% up until the second quarter
14I assume that monetary authority can not conduct unconventional policies such as quantitative easing.
15The nature of big recessionary shock moves the economy from the steady state hence I prefer non-linear
numerical solution of the equilibrium rather than local linearization around the steady state.
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of 2011. In the third quarter of 2011, it is below 1 base points which imply that the US
economy has been experiencing binding ZLB for almost 12 quarters. The annual inflation
rate is on average around 2.3%.16 Meanwhile, in 2008Q3 and 2008Q4 the price levels (GDP
Deflator-Personal Consumption Expenditures) fall by 1.4 % and 0.41% in quarter to quarter
terms, respectively.17 The real GDP in 2005 prices fell subsequently after the third quarter
of 2008 until the last quarter of 2009 in year to year base for up to 5%.18 Until 2011Q3,
the growth wasn’t promising as quarter to quarter growth stayed below 1%. In the current
model, I calibrate the model such that the preference shock will cause the ZLB to bind for
8 quarters and the output to drops by 5% on impact. The government spending for the
time period 1990Q1-2008Q3 varied around the mean 21% of GDP.19 In the fourth quarter
of 2008, the government purchases increase to 24% of GDP then kept rising above 26%.
The model is solved for T = 2000 periods and one period is one quarter. Government
expenditure, G and consumption, C are normalized by aggregate output. The steady
state output which is also target output level is set to 1. The steady state and the target
government expenditure as share of output, G is 20% which is close to historical average
of the US for the period 1990Q1-2008Q3. The steady state employment level is set to 1/3.
The steady state bond level, b is assumed to be 0. The target annual inflation rate, pi
is set to 3%.20 The discount factor is assumed to be 0.995 which leads to 4.75% steady
state annual nominal interest rate. The Fischer labor supply elasticity, 1/ω is assumed to
be 1. The degree of price stickiness is set to 0.85. The elasticity of substitution among
differentiated goods, ε is assumed to be 11. The rest of the parameters and the steady
state values are computed from the equilibrium conditions. As a benchmark analysis, the
government spending rises from 20% to 21% for 8 quarters, and it is financed by lump-sum
16CPI year to year inflation rate is 2.8% for the specified time period.
17According to CPI inflation calculations, quarter to quarter inflation is -2.82% and -0.49% for 2008Q3
and 2008Q4, respectively.
18From 2008Q3 to 2009Q2, real GDP fell (QTQ) by 1%, 2.3%, 1.7%, 0.1%. In year to year, the contraction
started from 2008Q2 and kept going until 2009Q4, by 0.6%, 3.3%, 4.5%, 5%, 3.73% and 0.5%.
19The government purchases calculated as the sum of current expenditures plus capital transfer payments
minus net purchases of non-produced assets from BEA Table 3.2 (line 41+line43-line44).
20Optimal monetary policy may require a different annual inflation rate. I assume that it is non-zero,
following Khan, King and Wolman (2003)42 and Schmit-Grohe and Uribe (2007)57.
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taxation. The government spending and lump-sum taxes do not respond to the output or
the debt level in the economy. The government spending cut comes after the end of the fiscal
stimulus. The time-gap is defined as the time between the end of the fiscal stimulus and
the start of the government spending cut. The present discounted value of the government
cut is the same as the present discounted value of fiscal stimulus, and it is kept the same
through the analysis.
2.3 Impulse Responses
2.3.1 Why does the ZLB matter?
Before going into details of the numerical results of the model, it is worth showing that
the ZLB matters for the effect of fiscal policy. Initially, the negative preference shock (higher
discount rate) (in the left panel of Figure 2.3) reduces today’s consumption as households
prefer to save more for future with or without the ZLB. However, if the monetary policy
cannot reduce the nominal interest rate below the ZLB, then the deflationary effect of
preference shock will reduce today’s consumption more due to a rise in real interest rate
through Fisher equation. Hence, when I allow the ZLB to be binding, the output and the
consumption will fall more than the case without ZLB (Figure 2.4 - Figure 2.5).
When the ZLB starts binding, fiscal policy can be used to stimulate the economy. In
this case, I assume that government spending rises from 20% to 21% for 8 quarters as the
economy is hit by the preference shock (in the right panel of Figure 2.3). The effect of
the fiscal stimulus is shown in Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7. This policy causes the output
to rise both in the absence and in the presence of the ZLB due to higher public demand
for the goods. However, consumption shows different responses, depending whether the
ZLB is binding or not. In fact, there can be three channels that can affect the consumption
decision when the government spending increases. First, the rise in government spending
may be financed by the taxes which in return curbs the private spending if the Ricardian
equivalence does not hold. Second, government’s demand for the goods makes the firms
increase the demand for labor, leading to higher employment and wage rate in the sticky
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price environment. Hence, the income effect works in the opposite direction and it increases
the consumption. The third channel that can affect the consumption decision is the real
interest rate whose direction depends on whether the ZLB is binding or not. If the nominal
interest rate is not constrained by the ZLB, then the net effect of government spending on
the nominal interest rate will be positive, as monetary authority can respond the inflationary
fiscal stimulus by increasing the interest rate. In this case, the real interest rate will increase,
too which would crowd out consumption (the red line in the upper right panel of Figure 2.6).
On the other hand, if the ZLB is binding, the net effect of fiscal stimulus on the real interest
rate is negative since the nominal interest rate is constant at the ZLB. Therefore the third
channel amplifies the income effect and increases the consumption if the ZLB is binding (the
blue line in the upper right panel of Figure 2.6).
As a third impact in addition to the impact of negative demand shocks and the impact
of fiscal stimulus, the effect of future government spending cuts after the initial fiscal
stimulus is to be analyzed. I first assume that the time gap between the fiscal stimulus and
the government spending cut is one quarter. The left panel of Figure 2.3 shows how the
government spending evolves over time.
I analyze the net effect of this fiscal program (initially, fiscal stimulus and then fiscal
consolidation) with and without the ZLB. Figure 2.8 and Figure 2.9 show the effect of the
fiscal program matters if the ZLB is binding or not. The net effect on the output is positive
on impact and it curbs the consumption in both cases. However, conditional on the timing
of the government spending cut, the magnitude of the changes in both variables is smaller
when the ZLB is binding. In order to see why consumption drops with this fiscal program, I
examine the net effect of the anticipated future government cuts that come two years after
the negative shock.
Figure 2.10 and Figure 2.11 give the net effect of the anticipated future government cuts
with and without ZLB. As mentioned above, government spending can affect the economy
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through three channels and the direction of the effect of the interest rate channel depends
on the ZLB. The future government cuts reduce the inflationary expectations today which
results in higher real interest rate and lower current consumption when the ZLB is binding.
However, the effect of the third channel is conditional on the timing of the government cuts.
2.3.2 Why does the timing of the government cuts matter?
Analyzing three different timing (one, eleven, and twenty quarters of time gap) of
government cuts reveals that the effect of the future anticipated cuts on the economy is
highly dependent on the timing. The early cuts have depressing effect on the economy since
deflationary effect of the cuts keeps the economy at the ZLB for longer period of time in
which case higher real interest rate suppresses the consumption. In Figure 2.13 the blue
line with circles shows that if the cuts come right after the fiscal stimulus, the reversal
suppresses the economy which can creates deflationary spirals in the economy21 as mentioned
in Corsetti et. al. (2010). Similarly the green line with cross shows the impulse responses
with 20 quarters time-gap. Future anticipated reversal stimulates the economy today but
the magnitude of the initial effect is less compared to the impact multiplier effect of the cuts
with 11 quarter time-gap.
2.4 Welfare Analysis of the Timing of Fiscal Consolidation
In the current section, I analyze the welfare cost of the future reversals with different
timing in order to see if there is a gain by delaying it. Although the timing affects the
dynamics, it does not change the steady state values for the economy. For that reason,
instead of comparing the welfare costs at the steady state, I compute the percentage of
consumption to make the consumers indifferent between the life-time allocations under the
policy of future cuts with each time-gap and the steady state allocations. The consumption
21Since the solution method forces the economy to go back to the steady state levels, the ZLB will be
binding temporarily. In this model, by construction the economy never gets stuck at the ZLB as a second
equilibrium.
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equivalence of the each timing compared to the steady state can be calculated by22
T∑
i=0
βieiU((1 + λt)C
t
i , N
t
i ) =
T∑
i=0
βiU(Css, Nss) for t = 0, 1, 2...
λt = exp
(
V s − V t∑T
i=0 β
iei
)
− 1 for t = 0, 1, 2...
where
V s =
T∑
i=0
βiU(Css, Nss) and V
t =
T∑
i=0
βieiU((1 + λi)C
t
i , N
t
i )
where Cti , N
t
i are the consumption and the employment levels of households when the
government cuts start t quarters after the initial fiscal stimulus. In the solution of the model
the life time period, T is set to be 2000 periods.23
Figure 2.14 displays how the welfare cost of the future government cuts differs as the
time-gap changes. In the graph, t = 0 shows the welfare cost of the preference shock
and fiscal stimulus as a response to the shock in the economy without consolidation. The
consolidation that comes right after the end of the fiscal stimulus curbs the consumption
as the real interest rate rises. Hence, the early consolidations are more costly than not
consolidating. However, as the economy recovers and as the government cuts are delayed,
the welfare cost decreases. 0.07 percent points welfare gain is possible if it is delayed for
eleven quarters.
Despite the U shape of the welfare cost, the results with too early and too late cuts are not
symmetric. The earlier reversals depress the economy more than the late ones. Regardless
of the timing, the government cuts decrease the demand, hence, this causes the output to
fall. However, if it is enacted early around the ZLB, it also suppresses the private demand
due to higher real interest rate.
22∑T
i=0 β
iei
(
log(1 + λ)Ci − χN
1+ω
i
1+ω
)
=
∑T
i=0 β
i
(
logCss − χN
1+ω
ss
1+ω
)
23However, the effect of the fiscal consolidation can be analyzed for very short run, short run, medium run
and long-run by adjusting T values.
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2.5 Models with Different Fiscal Rules
2.5.1 Lump-sum Taxation Rule
In the current section, I let the net lump-sum taxes respond to the output and debt
fluctuations to introduce one more fiscal instrument and to provide some debt dynamics in
the model. The fiscal rule for the lump-sum taxes follows as;
log
(
Tt/T
)
= 0.13 log
(
Yt/Y
)
+ 0.21 log
(
bt−1/Y
)
where the steady state lump-sum tax, T is 20% of output as the net supply of government
bonds is assumed to be 0. The parameters are Bayesian estimates for the US economy that
are borrowed from Leeper, Plante and Traum (2010)44.24 In their paper fiscal rules include
not only responses to debt level but also output level by all of the fiscal instruments, such
as lump-sum transfers, labor and capital income. They also take into account different fiscal
rules and their combinations in their model which gives the power of consistent robustness
checks for different fiscal rules. The automatic stabilizer parameter suggests that if the
output falls by 5% on impact, the lump-sum tax falls by 0.65%.
In Figure 2.15 and Figure 2.16 the blue line with circles shows the impulse responses to the
preference shock, the government spending rise and the future cuts. The red line with stars
shows the net effect of the future government cuts in the economy. The preference shock hits
the economy at t = 0 and the government announces that the government spendings will be
increased to 21% for 8 quarters and fiscal consolidation will occur 9 quarters after the end of
the stimulus.25 The rise in the government spending increases the debt and the lump-sum
taxes rise as a response to increasing debt. The net effect of future cuts mitigates the
current recession by increasing the current consumption through deflationary expectations
and fall in the future taxes. Anticipated future cuts decreases inflation expectations. As the
economy already exits the ZLB, monetary authority can reduce the nominal interest rate
24one should take the fit of these parameters in my model with a caveat since the model of Leeper et al.
(2010) is neoclassical growth model.
25Time-gap is set to 9 quarters since it minimizes the welfare cost in the economy which will be shown
below.
78
hence the real interest rate, responding to the government cuts. Additionally, the future
lump-sum taxes decrease due to fall in the debt level and the output which will lead to
higher consumption in the future. Through consumption smoothing, on impact current
consumption increases.
The timing of the future cuts matters in this case, too. Figure 2.17 shows the relation
between the welfare cost and the timing of fiscal consolidation when there is a lump-sum
taxation rule which is an automatic stabilizer and a debt stabilization. Similar to the initial
case, the earlier and the late reversals are more costly compared to the medium-run fiscal
consolidations. The optimal timing can provide 0.06 percent points welfare gains if the
government spending reversals start almost two years after the end of the fiscal stimulus.
Therefore the result that the cuts should come in the medium run after the recovery of the
economy is invariant to the constant lump-sum tax.
Figure 2.18 and Figure 2.19 give how the net effect of future fiscal consolidation differs
with the presence of the lump-sum taxation rule compared to the benchmark setup. The
impact multipliers for both consumption and output are higher when the fiscal consolidation
is partly done by the lump-sum taxation.
2.5.2 Distortionary Income Tax Rule
In this section, labor income taxation is incorporated in the model in order to see the
effect of fiscal consolidation. Labor income taxation affects the budget constraints of both
the households and the government in addition to labor supply decision due to the separable
form of utility function.
χNωt = C
−1
t (1− τt)wt
bt + τtNtwt = bt−1
Rt−1
pit
+Gt
GivenG = 0.20, the steady state level of labor income tax rate, τ is 0.22. The distortionary
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tax responds to the output and debt fluctuations as in the case of lump-sum taxes.26
log
(τt
τ
)
= 0.40 log
(
Yt
Y
)
+ 0.18 log
(
bt−1
Y
)
The net effect of future anticipated reversal is shown in Figure 2.20 and Figure 2.21 by
the red line with stars. An increase in labor income tax on impact distorts the labor supply
and hence reduces the output level. However, the net effect of future expectations about
the falling income tax rates is positive on consumption and output. The future income
effect of government spending cuts stimulates the private demand today, and it reduces the
duration of the ZLB as shown in lower left panel of Figure 2.21. Exiting the ZLB earlier
in return increases the stimulating effect of government reversals as the monetary policy
effectively reduces the interest rates. The timing of the reversal reserves its importance with
the distortionary taxation. Figure 2.23 suggests that still the reversal should come in the
medium run but later than the first two cases.
Figure 2.24 and Figure 2.25 display how the dynamics of the economy alter when there
is different type of fiscal instruments, stabilizing the economy. For each case the time-gap
is set to be the optimal one.27 The results show that analyzing the impact multiplier as a
performance indicator of the fiscal policy may lead to different results. For instance, the
economy where the lump-sum taxes stabilize the economy has bigger output and consumption
multiplier compared to benchmark case and distortionary taxation. However, in the longer
horizon, the consumption and the output are stimulated more with distortionary income tax
due to shorter duration of the ZLB and higher future income effect.
2.5.3 Government Spending Rule
In the current section the government spending is allowed to move endogenously with
the output and the debt fluctuations. Government spending rule follows;
26The fiscal rule parameters are borrowed from Leeper et. al (2010).
27It refers to the time-gap which minimizes the welfare cost in consumption terms.
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log(Gt/G) = −0.24 log(bt−1/Y )− 0.033 log(Yt/Y ) + εg,t (2.17)
As the output falls below the steady state level, the government expenditure rises as an
expansionary fiscal policy. Similarly, as the debt level increases, the government reduces its
spendings to stabilize the fiscal imbalances. If the economy is hit by a negative preference
shock, in this set-up the spendings are increased as lump-sum fashion (εg,t) to 21% of output
and also, endogenously as a response to the fall in the output on impact. In the upcoming
period, the government spendings decline slowly to stabilize the rising debt. In order to
have determinacy in the model, it is necessary to have lump-sum taxation rule (Baxter and
King (1993)5). For consistency with previous analysis I use the estimated coefficients from
Leeper et al. (2010) for a model with fiscal rules for both the government spendings and the
lump-sum taxes. This lets the tax level be determined as a response to the output as in the
following:
log(Tt/T ) = 0.11 log(Yt/Y )
Due to the automatic stabilization, the spending reversals endogenously take place even
if there is no announced future spending cuts. Figure 2.26 shows how the dynamics of
the economy evolve in case of only preference shock (the blue line with circles) and in the
presence of both fiscal stimulus and preference shock (the red line with stars). The net effect
of initial rise in government spending increases the public demand and therefore the output.
However, unlike the previous cases, the endogenous reversal does not have stimulating effect
on the private demand. In fact, it crowds out consumption for the first four quarters. It
is because as the debt level increases, automatic stabilization has to come earlier around
the ZLB, eight quarters after the shock hits the economy. Hence the deflationary effect of
government cuts increases today’s real interest rate at the ZLB.
In the next step, I introduce the future government cuts as a consolidation policy in
addition to automatic stabilization rule. In other words, the government announces at time
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0 that in addition to the fiscal policy rules, the government spending rises to 21% for eight
quarters and then government cuts start and last for four quarters The net effect of this
additional spending crowds out consumption and reduces the output on impact (Figure 2.27).
The additional spending cut causes a bigger magnitude of downsizing in the government
budget. When the monetary authority becomes effective to respond to this effect, the
nominal interest rate decreases, and hence the real interest rate does, too.
The welfare cost of the timing of additional spending cuts in the current set up shows
that the welfare gain from additional consolidation is negligible. In fact, too early spending
cuts are more costly than letting the government spendings be endogenously determined
(Figure 2.28). As the fiscal policy responds to the dynamics of the output and the debt, the
fiscal imbalances can be corrected with less welfare cost.
2.6 Conclusion
In the current paper, I analyze the effects of the timing of government reversals to correct
the fiscal imbalances. I find the optimal timing of fiscal consolidation by minimizing the
welfare cost over the time-gap. Although the current simple model shows that there are
gains with delaying the consolidation to a later time and it is robust to the different fiscal
rules, the fiscal policy rules are not necessarily optimal. As a next step, a model where the
welfare can be maximized by choosing the responsiveness of the fiscal instruments is to be
developed. In this setup the size and the timing of fiscal stimulus and consolidation can be
determined optimally. However, with the current solution method, it is hard to incorporate
such optimization problem. It may require linearization of the system of the equations -
second-order linearization of the policy functions for the welfare analysis- in which case the
solution analysis becomes around the steady state.
As a summary the anticipated future government spending cuts have amplifying effect
on the current fiscal stimulus and reduces the time that the economy is constrained by
ZLB only if it is enacted timely manner and when the government spending cuts do not
endogenously respond to the economy. However the precise optimal timing varies with the
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different fiscal policy rules, the fiscal consolidation in the medium run reduces the welfare
cost and the spending reversals in the very short-run are much costly.
When the labor income tax rates follow a stabilization rule, the future anticipated drop
in the labor income tax rate will stimulate the economy more than lump-sum taxation rule
and no fiscal rule cases. Although the impact multiplier for output and consumption is
smaller compared to other cases, in the medium run it increases the consumption and output
much more. It shows that only the impact multiplier analysis to evaluate the fiscal policies
may be misleading.
When the government spendings respond to the output and debt endogenously, the
fiscal consolidation occurs endogenously. In this case, additional government cuts depress
the economy further down. The welfare gain of additional cuts at the optimal time-gap is
negligible.
Moreover, for each analysis the government fully commits to the fiscal policy. Hence there
is no time-consistency problem however, discretionary fiscal consolidations (unanticipated
government spending cuts) might lead to different results as current consumption is affected
by expectations of future fiscal policies.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Derivations of the Equations
Derivation of demand from households and aggregate price level:
min
Cjt
1
0PjtCjtdj s.t. Ct =
(
1
0C
ε−1
ε
jt dj
) ε
ε−1
1
min
0
PjtCjtdj + Pt
[
Ct −
(
1
0C
ε−1
ε
jt dj
) ε
ε−1
]
Pjt = PtC
1/ε
t C
−1/ε
jt
Cjt =
(
Pjt
Pt
)−ε
Ct
Plug in this equation into the consumption aggregate
Ct =
10
[(
Pjt
Pt
)−ε
Ct
] ε−1
ε
dj

ε
ε−1
Pt =
(
1
0P
1−ε
jt dj
) 1
1−ε
Derivation of nominal marginal cost of firms :
min
Nt
wtPtNt +MCt (Yt − ZNt)
wtPt
Z
= MCnomt
wt
Z
= MCrealt
Derivation of optimal price level of firms:
∼
P j,t ≡ arg max
Pj,t
Et
∞
i=oqt,t+iθ
i
[
Yj,t+i(Pj,t)Pj,t
Pt+i
− wt+iYj,t+i(Pj,t)
Z
]
then
∼
P j,tis such that
Et
∞
i=oqt,t+iθ
i
Yj,t+i
(∼
P j,t
)
(1− ε)
Pt+i
+ ε
wt+iYj,t+i
(∼
P j,t
)
Z
∼
P j,t
 = 0
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Multiply by 1/(1− ε) and plug in the aggregate demand function for Yj,t+i
(∼
P j,t
)
,
Et
∞
i=oqt,t+iθ
i
 ∼P j,t
Pt+i
−ε Yt+i
Pt+i
− ε
ε− 1
wt+i
Z
∼
P j,t
 ∼P j,t
Pt+i
−ε Yt+i
 = 0
Et
∞
i=oqt,t+iθ
i
 ∼P j,t
Pt+i
−ε Yt+i
Pt+i
− ε
ε− 1Et
∞
i=oqt,t+iθ
i
 wt+i
Z
∼
P j,t
 ∼P j,t
Pt+i
−ε Yt+i
 = 0
Et
∞
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i
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Pt+i
1−ε Yt+i∼
P j,t
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ε− 1Et
∞
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i
 wt+i
Z
∼
P j,t
 ∼P j,t
Pt+i
−ε Yt+i
 = 0
Then multiply each side by
∼
P j,t
Et
∞
i=oqt,t+iθ
i
 ∼P j,t
Pt+i
1−ε Yt+i
 = ε
ε− 1Et
∞
i=oqt,t+iθ
i
wt+i
Z
 ∼P j,t
Pt+i
−ε Yt+i

Define Ft and Ht
Ft ≡ Et∞i=oqt,t+iθi
 ∼P j,t
Pt+i
1−ε Yt+i

Ht ≡ Et∞i=oqt,t+iθi
wt+i
Z
 ∼P j,t
Pt+i
−ε Yt+i

such that
Ft =
ε
ε− 1Ht
Then Ft can be written as
Ft ≡
 ∼P j,t
Pt
1−ε Yt + Et
 qt,t+1θ
(∼
P j,tpi
Pt+1
)1−ε
Yt+1
+qt,t+2θ
2
(∼
P j,tpi
2
Pt+2
)1−ε
Yt+2 + ...

Ft ≡
 ∼P j,t
Pt
1−ε Yt + qt,t+1θ
 ∼P j,tpi∼
P j,t+1
1−εEt

(∼
P j,t+1
Pt+1
)1−ε
Yt+1
+
qt,t+2
qt,t+1
θ
(∼
P j,t+1pi
Pt+2
)1−ε
Yt+2 + ...

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By definition of qt,t+1 qt,t+s/qt,t+m = qt+m,t+s where s > m > 0 hence
Ft ≡
 ∼P j,t
Pt
1−ε Yt + qt,t+1θ
 ∼P j,tpi∼
P j,t+1
1−εEt

(∼
P j,t+1
Pt+1
)1−ε
Yt+1
+qt+1,t+2θ
(∼
P j,t+1pi
Pt+2
)1−ε
Yt+2 + ...

Ft ≡
 ∼P j,t
Pt
1−ε Yt + qt,t+1θ
 ∼P j,t∼
P j,t+1
1−ε pi1−εFt+1
Then define P ∗t =
∼
P j,t
Pt
Ft ≡ P ∗1−εt Yt + qt,t+1θ
(
P ∗t
P ∗t+1
)1−ε( Pt
Pt+1
)1−ε
pi1−εFt+1
Ft ≡ P ∗1−εt Yt + qt,t+1θ
(
P ∗t
P ∗t+1
)1−ε( pi
pit+1
)1−ε
Ft+1
Similarly Ht can be written as
Ht ≡ wt
Z
 ∼P j,t
Pt
−ε Yt + Et
 qt,t+1θ
wt+1
Z
(∼
P j,tpi
Pt+1
)−ε
Yt+1
+qt,t+2θ
2wt+1
Z
(∼
P j,tpi
2
Pt+2
)−ε
Yt+2 + ...

Ht ≡ wt
Z
 ∼P j,t
Pt
−ε Yt + qt,t+1θ
 ∼P j,tpi∼
P j,t+1
−εEt

wt+1
Z
(∼
P j,t+1
Pt+1
)−ε
Yt+1
+
qt,t+2
qt,t+1
θwt+1Z
(∼
P j,t+1pi
Pt+2
)−ε
Yt+2 + ...

By definition of qt,t+1 qt,t+s/qt,t+m = qt+m,t+s where s > m > 0 hence
Ht ≡ wt
Z
 ∼P j,t
Pt
−ε Yt + qt,t+1θ
 ∼P j,tpi∼
P j,t+1
−εEt

wt+1
Z
(∼
P j,t+1
Pt+1
)−ε
Yt+1
+qt+1,t+2θ
wt+1
Z
(∼
P j,t+1pi
Pt+2
)−ε
Yt+2 + ...

Ht ≡ wt
Z
 ∼P j,t
Pt
−ε Yt + qt,t+1θ
 ∼P j,t∼
P j,t+1
−ε pi−εHt+1
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Then define P ∗t =
∼
P j,t
Pt
Ht ≡ wt
Z
P ∗−εt Yt + qt,t+1θ
(
P ∗t
P ∗t+1
)−ε
pi−ε
(
Pt
Pt+1
)−ε
Ht+1
Ht ≡ wt
Z
P ∗−εt Yt + qt,t+1θ
(
P ∗t
P ∗t+1
)−ε( pi
pit+1
)−ε
Ht+1
qt,t+1 is stochastic discount factor which is;
β
edt+1
edt
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−1
βedt
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−1
=
pit+1
Rt
Derivation of price dispersion law of motion:
St ≡
∫ 1
0
(
Pj,t
Pt
)−ε
dj = (1− θ)
 ∼P j,t
Pt
−ε + θ(1− θ)
 ∼P j,t−1pi
Pt
−ε
+ θ2(1− θ)
 ∼P j,t−2pi2
Pt
−ε + ....+ θt(P0
Pt
)−ε
St = (1− θ)
 ∼P j,t
Pt
−ε + θ(Pt−1
Pt
)−ε
pi−ε
 (1− θ)
(∼
P j,t−1
Pt−1
)−ε
+θ(1− θ)
(∼
P j,t−2pi
Pt−1
)−ε
+ ....+ θt−1
(
P0
Pt−1
)−ε

St = (1− θ)
 ∼P j,t
Pt
−ε + θ(Pt−1
Pt
)−ε
pi−εSt−1
St = (1− θ)P ∗−εt + θ
(
pi
pit
)−ε
St−1
Derivation of relation of relative optimal price level and inflation:
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
P 1−εj,t dj
) 1
1−ε
= (1− θ)
( ∼
Pt
)1−ε
+ θ (piPt−1)1−ε
1 = (1− θ)
 ∼Pt
Pt
1−ε + θ(piPt−1
Pt
)1−ε
1 = (1− θ) (P ∗t )1−ε + θ
(
pi
pit
)1−ε
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where
∼
Pt is the optimal price level of each firm which is the same under identical firm
assumption.
2.7.2 Steady State Values
The steady state values of G,T,R, pi, Y and N will be calibrated for the US data. B can
be assumed to be zero or non-zero. For now, steady state values of government debt and
whether the ZLB binds or not is not taken into account.
From Euler Equation β can be found from steady state values as in the following
βR
pi
= 1
Labor supply decision of the households will give
χNω = C−1w
In the steady state it is assumed that the price dispersion is unitary since the optimal
prices are adjusted. Hence
ZN = Y
Z = Y/N
The aggregate production is equal to aggregate expenditure in the economy
Y = C +G
F =
ε
ε− 1H
F =
1
1− βθY
H =
1
1− βθY
w
Z
88
wZ
=
ε− 1
ε
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2.7.3 Figures
Figure 2.1: Annual debt per GDP in percentages for the US, the
UK, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain between
2004-2017
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Figure 2.2: The policy rates for the US, the UK, and the Eurozone
for 2006Q1-2017Q1
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Note: The source of the federal fund rates is the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (US) Statistical Interactive Database. The source
of the official bank rate of Bank of England is Bank of England at this
webpage2. The source of deposit facility rates of European Central Bank
(ECB) is key ECB interest rates at this webpage1
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Figure 2.3: Path of the growth rate of the discount factor as a
negative demand shock and path of the government spending as a
fiscal policy instrument
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Figure 2.4: Impulse responses to the preference shock with and
without the ZLB
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Note: The blue line with circles shows the impulse responses with a binding
ZLB. The red line with stars shows the impulse responses with no binding
ZLB.
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Figure 2.5: Impulse responses to the preference shock with and
without the ZLB
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Note: The blue line with circles shows the impulse responses with a binding
ZLB. The red line with stars shows the impulse responses with no binding
ZLB.
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Figure 2.6: Impulse responses to fiscal stimulus with and without
the ZLB
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Note: Net effect of fiscal stimulus means the difference between the case
with the negative demand shock and the fiscal stimulus and the case with
the negative demand shock. The blue line with circles shows the impulse
responses with a binding ZLB. The red line with stars shows the impulse
responses with no binding ZLB.
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Figure 2.7: Impulse responses to fiscal stimulus with and without
the ZLB
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responses with no binding ZLB.
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Figure 2.8: Impulse responses to fiscal stimulus and future
government spending reversal.
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ZLB. The red line with stars shows the impulse responses with no binding
ZLB.
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Figure 2.9: Impulse responses to fiscal stimulus and future
government spending reversal.
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Figure 2.10: Impulse responses to future government spending
reversal.
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Figure 2.11: Impulse responses to future government spending
reversal.
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Figure 2.12: Impulse responses to future government reversal with
different timing.
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Note: The blue line with circles shows the impulse responses to net
spending reversal that is conducted one quarter after the end of the fiscal
stimulus. The red line with stars shows the impulse responses to net
spending reversal that is conducted eleven quarters after the end of the
fiscal stimulus.The green line with pluses shows the impulse responses to
net spending reversal that is conducted twenty quarters after the end of the
fiscal stimulus.
101
Figure 2.13: Impulse responses to future government reversal with
different timing.
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Note: The blue line with circles shows the impulse responses to net
spending reversal that is conducted one quarter after the end of the fiscal
stimulus. The red line with stars shows the impulse responses to net
spending reversal that is conducted eleven quarters after the end of the
fiscal stimulus.The green line with pluses shows the impulse responses to
net spending reversal that is conducted twenty quarters after the end of the
fiscal stimulus.
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Figure 2.14: The relation between the welfare cost and the timing
of the future government reversals when there is no fiscal rule in the
economy.
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Figure 2.15: Impulse responses with the lump-sum tax rule.
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The blue line with circles shows the impulse responses to preference shock,
fiscal stimulus and future government reversal. The red line with stars
shows the net effect of future government reversal with 9 quarters time-gap.
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Figure 2.16: Impulse responses with the lump-sum tax rule.
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The blue line with circles shows the impulse responses to preference shock,
fiscal stimulus and future government reversal. The red line with stars
shows the net effect of future government reversal with 9 quarters time-gap.
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Figure 2.17: The relation between the welfare cost and the timing
of the future government reversals when there is lump-sum taxation
rule in the economy.
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Note: X-axis displays the time-gap between the end of fiscal stimulus and
the beginning of spending reversal that lasts four quarters. Y-axis displays
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Figure 2.18: Net effect of future fiscal consolidation with and
without lump-sum tax rule.
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Figure 2.19: Net effect of future fiscal consolidation with and
without lump-sum tax rule.
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Figure 2.20: Impulse responses with distortionary income tax rule
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fiscal stimulus and future government reversal. The red line with stars
shows the net effect of future government reversal with 15 quarters
time-gap in the presence of labor income taxation rule.
Figure 2.21: Impulse responses with distortionary income tax rule.
time
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
%
 S
t.S
t. 
De
via
tio
ns
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Output
time
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
%
 S
t.S
t. 
De
via
tio
ns
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Consumption
time
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
%
 S
t.S
t. 
De
via
tio
ns
-1.4
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
Nominal Interest Rate
time
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
St
.S
t. 
De
via
tio
ns
 
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Inflation
Total Effect
Net Effect of G cut
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shows the net effect of future government reversal with 15 quarters
time-gap in the presence of labor income taxation rule.
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Figure 2.22: The effect of timing of future government spending
cuts on the duration of the ZLB.
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Figure 2.23: The relation between the welfare cost and the timing
of the future government reversals in the presence of the labor
income tax rate rule.
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Figure 2.24: Impulse responses without fiscal consolidation, with
lump sum tax rule and with labor income tax rule
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Figure 2.25: Impulse responses without fiscal consolidation, with
lump sum tax rule and with labor income tax rule
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Figure 2.26: Impulse responses with a government spending rule
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Figure 2.27: Impulse responses with both a government spending
rule and an additional fiscal consolidation
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Figure 2.28: The relation between the welfare cost and the timing
of the future government reversals in the presence of the
government spending rule
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